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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis investigates the nature of consumer brands in the context of the contemporary 
realism debate. It comprises three chapters. The first chapter introduces the what, the why 
and the how of brands, to wit: I describe what brands are and why brands exist, as well as 
how they are designed. In the second chapter, motivated by my pursuit to answer the 
question: Are Brands Real? I review three influential proposals by Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord, Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright about how to distinguish realist from 
anti-realist views about disputed entities within particular domains, in order to develop a 
toolkit, which I will employ in the third Chapter to answer that key question. The result 
of this investigation shows that the answer, which prior to the inquiry might have struck 
some as obvious, is somewhat more nuanced and complex. 
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ON BRANDS 
An Investigation Into the Nature of Consumer Brands | Are they real or constructed? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Brands are everywhere. Recognized as products, Evian bottles wash up on shore, dumped 
by cruise ships far out at sea. You may drive “a Volvo” to work every day; or a Ford or a 
Chevy or a BMW – one that you've specifically chosen for a variety of (personal) reasons: 
design, safety, fuel economy, price, status etc. You dress in various brands of clothing – 
Fruit of the Loom, Levi’s, Ralph Lauren or Donna Karan – every morning before going to 
work or to school and you communicate using many of a growing number of them – 
Samsung, Blackberry, iPhone – “anytime, anywhere”. Evidence of brands in the form of 
logos and advertising can be seen on websites, sports uniforms, subways, airlines and 
grocery aisles. They are served up by Google and give rise to a forest of urban signs, both 
digital and traditional, that crowd our skylines. Yet, whether you’re pro-logo or no-logo,1 
brands are undoubtedly here to stay. And they are arguably more ubiquitous and 
proliferating faster than ever before, thanks to rapid developments in communications 
technology, particularly social media and the advent of celebrity and personal branding.  
 
But what are brands really? On the one hand, they seem somewhat akin to products of 
artistic creation – at least in terms of their visual identity and advertising. As such, one 
might think to look to answer the question as to the status and nature of brands by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Reference to Naomi Klein’s 1999 book No Logo. 
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referring to the plentiful literature written on aesthetics and the philosophy of art. And yet, 
though some brands arguably do have beautiful visual identities, print ads and videos, so 
created by a team of talented, specially trained designers, the motivation for brands is not 
as ends in themselves, but is of a more transactional nature. Specifically, brands are 
spurred into being by companies who wish to use them as a call-to-action2 i.e. brands and 
forms of branding are created to capture the hearts and minds of a particular audience in 
order for the targeted audience to be persuaded to buy a particular product or service. In 
this way, brands are tools of commerce, funded to add corporate value and generate 
profits in an ever more competitive commercial landscape.  
 
Brands are also unique in terms of how they are created. Works of art are often, but not 
always, created as the result of a vision of one artist, and often in relation to a particular 
subject matter. Brands, on the other hand, are created by teams of branding professionals, 
the vision of which is often co-created with the client/brand owner and refined during the 
process of brand building as a result of research conducted with an intended audience. In 
this way, brand builders, though firmly of the view brands are constructed, also grant an 
equal if not considerable process of discovery.3 
 
As a creative professional, this thesis project began, for me, in the course of being tasked 
with the development and communication of client brands. Having studied under Charles 
Taylor as an undergraduate at McGill, my interest in philosophy flourished and persisted 
long after graduating.  An avid reader of Plato, most particularly his Forms, I continued to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For definitions for branding terminology see Brand Glossary references provided in the Bibliography of this thesis. 
3 At least the ones that I’ve had conversations with. 
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take philosophy courses via the University of Waterloo’s Centre for Extended Learning. 
Combining my personal and professional passion, I began to think about patterns in the 
nature of Forms and similar patterns in the nature of brands. And yet brands, on my view, 
were something uniquely different – something both real and concrete. Brands, it seems 
to me, are real, if abstract, things, with their own natures, things about which we could be 
right or wrong.  And yet, unlike, for instance, numbers, where one could take 
straightforward Platonist realism seriously, brands are not timeless and immutable in our 
interactions with them, nor in our shared stories about them.  What, then, is their 
metaphysical status?  Are brands real? Or, are they merely constructed? The answer, I 
suggest, is both subtle and interesting in that it may not be a simple case of either/or.  
 
It is the intent of this paper to investigate the nature of brands in order to show that this is 
so. I will confine my inquiry to the status and nature of consumer brands,4 as B2C 
(business to consumer) branding and marketing is my particular area of expertise - not 
because other types of brands are less worthy of investigation. The brands I will consider 
are large, multinational brands, which I have chosen strictly for the purpose of ease of 
recognition by most readers, wherever they happen to reside. Lastly, I limit myself to 
consumer brands rather than personal or B2B (business to business) brands in order to 
keep this project manageable, though I suspect the outcomes would be much the same, 
were I to apply the same lessons. However, I cannot make this claim with confidence, as I 
will not have done the work.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For simplicity, commencing in Chapter One, I will refer to consumer brands merely as brands. 
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Briefly, the narrative of my thesis – ON BRANDS – will proceed as follows. In Chapter 
One, I draw on existing literature on creating consumer brands and insights derived from 
interviews conducted with professionals within the creative industry, as well as my own 
experience, in order to review the nature of consumer brands and the creation of brand 
identity from the perspective of the professionals who participate directly in this process. 
In Chapter Two, I assemble a philosophical toolkit to address the question “Are Brands 
Real?” More precisely, I describe a few key currents in contemporary philosophical 
discussions related to the realism debate that address the question of how to make 
progress in debates about the reality of a particular class of things; influential currents that 
attempt to bridge the gap between hardened realists and anti-realists, offering common 
ground for a more constructive debate to take shape. I begin by outlining various, albeit 
limited, developments in meta-ethics as outlined by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, then review 
the key proposal about realism and anti-realism found in the work of renowned 
philosopher Michael Dummett. I argue that these two proposals are not subtle enough to 
make the key distinctions that illuminate the true nature of brands.  I then turn to an 
examination of Crispin Wright’s approach, especially as it is described in his seminal 
book Truth and Objectivity.  Sympathetic to a pluralist view, the answer to the question 
“Are Xs real?” – if Wright is right – is almost always “it depends what you 
mean.”  Finally, in Chapter Three, I apply the tools explored in Chapter Two to the nature 
of consumer brands as described in Chapter One and so am able to provide a plausible 
and coherent answer to what the question of whether or not brands are real depends on. 
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CHAPTER ONE | ON BRANDS 
 
 
 
 
1.01 | THE WHAT AND THE WHY OF BRANDS 
  WHAT ARE BRANDS? WHY DO THEY EXIST?  
 
 
In this chapter, I briefly examine the very complex nature of brands and to a lesser degree 
that of the branding process. As stated in the introduction, my particular interest and focus 
lies in the creative process of building brand identity. To begin, the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ 
of brands will be explored. That is to say, I will ask and seek to answer the questions: 
What are they? Why do they exist? What elements do they comprise? What is their 
function? Once a general overview of what brands are, and why they are, has been 
established, I will move on to unpacking the process of building brand identity. Note, the 
language used within this chapter is not philosophical, but practical. References to 
existence are not meant metaphysically, nor do the words “create”, “design”, “construct”,  
“build”, “truth” or “exist” anchor to any realist or anti-realist platform. The language 
within this chapter is the language used by professionals within the branding industry. My 
philosophical inquiry begins in Chapter Two. 
 
WHAT IS A BRAND? 
So, let’s start with the basic question: “What is a brand?”  A seemingly simple and 
straightforward question in non-philosophical terms, and an equally simple and 
straightforward answer to which may be extracted from any dictionary. According to the 
	   6 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, a brand is “a trade mark” as in “goods of particular make or 
trademark.” So, a brand is a trademark. This naturally leads us to seek the definition of 
trademark, which, within the same source, is defined as a “device or word or words 
legally registered (or established by use) as distinguishing a manufacturer’s or traders 
goods.” And so we emerge with the first kernel of understanding what a brand is. A brand 
is a device or a word employed to differentiate goods (or services) from one another – 
similar or otherwise. Thus a brand identifies a good or service as unique and attributable 
to a particular producer or service provider. As an introduction, I hope this will suffice as 
to generally inform the question “What is a brand?” What I am confident will emerge 
through the course of this paper, however, is that brands are so much more than this 
preliminary description suggests.   
 
WHY DO THEY EXIST? 
Next question. “Why do they exist?” Admittedly, this seems a ridiculous question in our 
current age of brand ubiquity. Most of us would be hard pressed to fathom a place or an 
environment that has not somehow been infiltrated by brands – THE NORTH FACE in 
the arctic, Range Rover in the deserts surrounding Dakar, Blackberry in the hand of the 
President of the United States of America, Coca-Cola served on a flight to the Kingdom 
of Bhutan. Stand in the middle of Times Square5 and you’ll be visually bombarded with 
brands claiming every square inch of available advertisable real estate, for clothing, 
cosmetics, jewelry, music, travel, entertainment, celebrity – often all on one billboard. But 
you needn’t even venture so far afield; you merely have to take a look around the room 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See live webcam of Time Square NYC, NY http://worldcam.eu/25,1,32,webcam.html 
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you’re sitting in right now. There’s bound to be at least ten branded items in plain sight, 
from the shoes on your feet and the type of coffee you are drinking, to the cell phone in 
your pocket and the computer you may be reading this thesis on. And it’s not just things – 
no longer the exclusive domain of celebrities, everyday people like you and I are now 
encouraged to consider ourselves as brands and market ourselves in the workplace6 and 
socially7 etc. But I digress. The focus of this investigation is on brands as they pertain to 
consumer goods and services. Personal brands, albeit interesting and extremely curious, 
will have to wait for another day. 
 
So, back to the questions: Brands |“Why do we have them?” And “Why do they exist?”  
Just because brands are everywhere now, doesn’t mean it was always so. In fact, the 
actual origin of brands dates back to the days of medieval trading. The ancient Norse 
word brandr, 8 means to burn (with a sword) and thus leave a (burnt) mark - on livestock, 
sheep for example, that would identify certain animals as belonging to a specific 
owner/seller when brought to market.9 Thus brands were a way for medieval market goers 
to not only to identify ownership, but also to determine, based on that unique mark, which 
livestock/product to buy based on the personal knowledge the buyer had of the seller 
and/or his product, or based on the reputation in terms of the quality or price of the 
products sold by a particular seller, as well as the reputation of the seller himself i.e. his 
honesty, integrity etc. This medieval practice serves to reveal what is still very much at 
the very core of the relationship between brands and consumers today – perception and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See many a profile on Linkedin. 
7 Ibid Facebook. 
8 Clifton Simmons et al. Brands and Branding. Princeton: Bloomberg Press. 2004. 13. 
9 Now as we all know – or at least those of us who count them - then as today, no two sheep are the same. Yet the important thing to 
note about brands in this sense (and in fact in every sense) is not so much the identity of the individual “sheep” themselves as to whom 
they belong. 
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trust i.e. what motivates consumers to choose to enter into a transaction – be it economic, 
social, cultural, or personal – with a particular brand(s) rather than another is still largely, 
if not wholly-based on recognizing the identity of and having trust in the reliability and 
value of the product/service, as well as believing in the integrity of seller. Consumers 
expect the value (or in industry terms the “brand promise”) presented by, or perceived to 
exist within, a particular brand is true and will be fulfilled if purchased. If fulfilled, 
consistently and hence reliably, consumer trust and thereby consumer loyalty is 
established through first-hand experience, or via less direct evidence, as the result of 
recommendation by a trusted source like a friend, family member or colleague etc.  
 
Alina Wheeler, author of the quintessential branding guide Designing Brand Identity, 
offers perhaps the most succinct contextual answer to the blended questions “What is a 
brand?” And “Why do they exist?”   
 
“As competition creates infinite choices, companies look for ways to connect 
emotionally with customers, become irreplaceable, and create lifelong 
relationships. A strong brand stands out in a densely crowded marketplace. 
People fall in love with brands, trust them, and believe in their superiority.” 
(Wheeler 2). 
 
So, to recap, a brand is a ‘mark’ that provides a product or service with a unique visual 
identity, which in turn enables a product/service to differentiate itself from other like 
products within a market characterized by competition. It is also the embodiment of a 
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brand promise. But a mark does not make a brand – at least not in the modern sense. 
There are a variety of essential elements to a brand and the process of branding, which are 
necessary in order for brands to be authentic and to successfully convey, as well as 
reassure and engage consumers over the long term, that they are, and continue to be, the 
ideal choice10 within a crowded marketplace. 
 
 
1.01.1 | BRAND AND BRANDING ELEMENTS 
 
The terms brand and branding are often confused. Moreover, branding itself is often 
confused with marketing, PR and advertising.11 In this section, I will outline the main 
elements of both terms in order to make clear to the reader that while brand and branding 
are both inter-related, they are also distinct. However, this will serve mainly as an 
overview and introduction to the section on building brand identity, which is the more 
relevant aspect of my philosophical investigation.  
 
There are three main elements to a brand’s identity. They are 1) the brand’s visual 
identity, 2) the brand promise, and 3) the brand messaging. Once the brand’s identity has 
been established, the process of branding (to the consumer) can begin. Branding is a 
process delineated by a brand strategy, which entails communications, marketing, PR and 
experiential/engagement components. The branding process is crucially concerned with 
not only communicating but also reinforcing the brand’s identity with brand advertising, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Quote by David Haigh, CEO, Brand Finance in Alina Wheeler’s Designing Brand Identity. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
2013), 2. 
11 Karin E. Klein, “A Practical Guide to Branding”, Bloomberg Business Week, June 09, 2008; accessed 10 June 2014. 
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and, most importantly (to consumers), consistently delivering a cohesive, authentic and 
true brand experience via all its touch points12 in order to secure the objective of every 
brand – consumer loyalty. 
 
1.01.1.1 | BRAND ELEMENTS 
 
Visual Identity 
A brand’s visual identity is perhaps the single most commonly associated brand element 
with what a brand is. And perhaps unsurprisingly so, as it’s often the first thing one sees 
when encountering a brand. The visual identity of a brand is generally composed of a 
name, an icon/graphic element, a colour(s), a font(s) and a tagline. Taken together, a 
name, a specific colour or colours and an icon are commonly referred to as a logo. An 
example, of arguably one of the most recognized logos of this century, is the Coca-Cola™ 
logo: 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of a visual identity is to secure a consistent, and most importantly, coherent 
image in the mind of the consumer – an anchor, per se, to the brand.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 According to Alina Wheeler, brand touchpoints include: websites, newsletters, emails, signage, apps, employees, presentations, 
tradeshows, blogs, environments, mobile video, packaging and exhibits. For a comprehensive list see Building Brand Identity, 3. 
Coca-Cola® Logo 
Visual Identity 
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Voice 
Though not part of the visual identity, yet intimately related thereto, is the brand “voice” 
or “tone”, which is also crucial to brand consistency and coherence. Most immediately 
conveyed by the tagline, the brand voice/tone is also distinctly reflected in the colour(s) 
chosen for the visual identity, as well as in the copywriting for multi-channel media 
communications, traditional print marketing collateral and in the audio developed for 
media ads. A brand’s voice must reflect the brand’s personality seamlessly. A discordant 
voice brings discord to the brand, and thus the opportunity for audience to be confused or 
even repelled by the brand. For example, if McDonald’s launched a campaign in which its 
“I’m lovin it” tagline melody sounded like a funeral march layered onto a TV commercial 
of children playing in an outdoor playground while mischievously devouring their 
favourite French fries – the branding department and the creative agency hired, might 
have some explaining to do … 
 
Finally, brand owners take their brand’s visual identity very seriously. Small business 
owners may not be in the position to go the same lengths, merely because of the 
significant expense, but medium to larger companies usually register the trademark of  
their brand name, which you can recognize by the symbol ® for registered trademark, or 
™ for trademark and even © for copyright.13 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Please note that I do not own the copyright to any of these logos. I am merely using them to illustrate examples of visual identity. 
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Visual Identity | Sample Trademarked Logos 
 
It is also common for large corporations also register the colour and often the fonts they 
use in their brand’s visual identity e.g. the “IBM blue”, “Harley-Davidson orange”, 
“Coca-Cola red”. Some even go so far as to register their product’s dye colour e.g. Heinz 
Ketchup red, French’s Mustard yellow, and the arrangement of colours in patterns  – as 
with Burberry’s signature plaid – all with the aim of legally preventing imitators from co-
opting the elements of their proprietary brand identities. 
 
Brand Promise | to be the “est” 
Brands are made up of both intangible and tangible elements. The tangible – that which 
we see – its visual identity, has been outlined above. The (only) intangible is its core 
value – that which the brand promises to deliver to the consumer: the cleanest laundry, the 
sharpest knife, the safest car, the cheapest prices, the most delicious coffee, the best fitting 
jeans, the most trustworthy news etc. Brand loyalty is that which consumers offer a 
company in exchange for a brand fulfilling its promise to be the “est”. If a brand does not 
(either once or consistently) fulfill its promise, consumers often can, and do, lose faith in 
a brand. If they choose to reject it, they may move to place their loyalty in a brand that 
does fulfill its promise and thus earns their trust. As such, a proven brand promise is 
arguably the single most important asset a brand has. 
Microsoft ® Logo Christie (Digital) ® Logo Google ™ Logo 
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“A brand promise is the commitment to deliver made between that brand 
and its audience. It’s made … in order to encourage that audience to buy. 
Ultimately … a promise lives or dies on whether it is believed and delivered 
on … but the promise itself is shaped by a range of factors: the nature of the 
offering; the capabilities and capacity of the brand; the rival promises of 
competitors.”14 
 
A brand’s core value, otherwise known within the industry as its raison d’etre15 or its truth 
or essence, 16 as expressed by its brand promise, is also the source of a brand’s positioning 
i.e. how it distinguishes itself from its competition. Volvo for example, has a brand 
promise to be the safest car. Volvo consistently delivers on this promise.17 Volvo’s brand 
promise allows it to distinguish itself from other cars in its category – luxury mid-size 
cars such as Audi, BMW, Lexus, Lincoln, Mercedes18 – and thereby secure the “top of 
mind” position for whom safety is a primary, if not ultimate concern when purchasing a 
vehicle. To help visualize the brand promise’s layers of “est”, I offer the following 
diagram. For clarification, INTERNAL means that the brand owner and/or creative 
professionals have identified the core value(s) to be associated with the brand. 
EXTERNAL identifies the messaging orientation to external audiences i.e. consumers, 
not internal messaging to the company/brand itself. Note that some layers are either/or, 
some are both, and that each informs the other in chronological order. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Mark Di Somma. Brand Strategy Insider. “Brand Promise, Getting the Brand Promise Right” (26 June 2013) 
http://www.brandingstrategyinsider.com/brand-promise; accessed June 15, 2014. 
15 http://www.fastcodesign.com/3020822/innovation-by-design/6-branding-lessons-from-eurostars-first-ever-creative-director (October 
30, 2013). 
16 Not to be confused with philosophical notions of truth or essence. 
17 Safety Category: http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2014/02/2014-car-brand-perception-survey/index.htm ; accessed 24 Aug 
2014. 
18 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, http://www.iihs.org/iihs/ratings/v/class-summary/midsize-luxury-near-luxury-cars; accessed 
2013. 
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Figure 1. | Layers of “est”  
[From core value to brand positioning: 1 informs 2, 2 informs 3] 
 
 
It is important to note that companies who are not clear on their brand’s core value are 
thus unable to clearly articulate their brand promise, which in turn makes it difficult for 
them to clearly communicate to their target audience what their position is within the 
competitive landscape i.e. who/what the brand is, why the audience should care and why 
they should buy.  
 
Brand Messaging 
“The best brands speak with one distinctive voice. On the web, in a tweet, in 
conversations with a salesperson, in a speech given by the president, the 
company needs to project the same unified message. It must be memorable, 
identifiable, and centred on the customer.” (Wheeler 26) 
 
Brand messaging, in order to be “authentic” and thus successful, requires that a brand 
speak with a true19 “voice”. This voice conveys a distinct “personality” – one that, in 
tandem with its visual identity, conveys a unified brand identity to the consumer. 
Brand personalities are crucial to brands. They serve to humanize the company, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 We are not here speaking in terms of philosophical truth but in terms of being coherent, unified and in character, thus authentic. 
3. Brand Positioning (be) the safest car | EXTERNAL 
2. Brand Promise (to be) the safest car | INTERNAL/EXTERNAL 
1. Core Value (what it is to be) the safest car | INTERNAL 
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product or service they represent/embody. This facilitates the development of a more 
intimate relationship with the consumer over the long term. 
 
Central to brand messaging is the meaning behind what is to be conveyed to the 
customer. Of critical importance is assessing whether the customer understands what it 
is the brand is trying to say/convey. Of course brand promise and positioning feed into 
messaging, but this does not necessarily ensure that your messaging is clear and 
concise. “Brand messages work well if they distill the essence of the product or 
service.” (ibid).  The message is projected by the voice and tone of the brand. If these 
are not in sync with the message, then not only will the message fall flat, but the brand 
will as well. Lack of a coherent and clear brand message, including voice, tone, 
content and language is the sure recipe for a failed brand.  
 
1.01.1.2 | BRANDING ELEMENTS 
 
The two main components that fall under the umbrella of “Branding” are Brand 
Communications and Brand Experience. Though essential to the brand, I will only briefly 
touch upon these categories and the elements of which they are comprised, and will focus 
instead on building brand identity in the next section. 
 
Brand Communications | Awareness and a Call-to-Action 
The goal of brand communications is to generate awareness for the brand, its product or 
service.  More specifically, in strategic terms, the central task of brand communications is 
	   16 
to generate awareness of not only the brand, product or service per se, but the value of the 
brand, product or service embodies. In order to do this, brand communications strategies 
are focused on communicating the brand message across those channels relevant to the 
target audience. More robustly, brand communication is focused on communicating the 
brand story (its image, personality and its value and the tone and nature of the desired 
relationship with its audience) to both existing and new audiences (depending upon the 
timeline of a brand’s lifecycle).  
 
In addition to the goal of generating awareness, the underlying objective of brand 
communications is most often to motivate audiences to buy the product or services and 
thus incorporate the brand into their experience. How this is communicated is via what in 
industry terms is called a call-to-action. To generate awareness and communicate the 
value of a new or existing product or service in tandem with a call-to-action is the 
function of an in-house branding team, the execution of which may be assigned to an 
external creative agency. 20   
 
Brand communications are meant to sustain the brand in the marketplace and build 
ongoing relationships with consumers21 for the lifetime of the brand. How effective a 
brand communications strategy is in telling the brand story is directly related to how 
relevant the brand’s story is in relation to its intended audience’s needs, wants, interests 
and values. If the audience can identify with the brand story i.e. if the brand story 
resonates with the aspirations, desires and/or motivation the audience has to fulfill a need, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Smaller companies in the former case, larger in the latter. 
21 Melissa Davis The Fundamentals of Branding. (London: AVA Publishing SA. 2009) 60. 
	   17 
problem, want, interest or value and thereby illicits a (trans)action, then its call-to-action 
is measured as successful. The main vehicle to transmit brand story is, of course, 
advertising. 
         
As an aside, in an age of rapid technological advancements in communications channels22 
and fickle attention spans, both the medium and the message are key in conveying the 
brand story in a clear, concise, engaging and effective manner. Getting the message just 
right, and consistently so, has become an unprecedented challenge with limits presented, 
for example, by 140 characters (or less).23 Challenge or not, the future of brand 
communication knows no bounds. If they build it, brand communicators will be keen to 
discover ways of creating a message for it. Moreover, with the advent of social media, not 
only do the brands communicate their story, but consumers participate in developing it as 
well. This is a striking and complex phenomenon within the world of marketing and 
advertising – worthy of a thesis itself – thus I merely make mention of it here to highlight 
a new and interesting direction and move on. 
 
Brand Experience 
If you keep company with marketing professionals, it may seem everything today is about 
“experience” – user experience, student experience, customer experience – so it should 
come as no surprise that a central concern among brands and branding professionals is the 
brand experience i.e. the experience consumers (and prospective consumers) have when 
interacting with a brand once the visual identity, the brand promise, position, message and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Communications channels include traditional (print, radio, TV, event and in store) and digital media channels (social media and 
internet).  Taken as a whole, this is currently referred to as ‘trans-media’, and thus ‘trans-media storytelling’ is a term used by the 
creative industry. The channels themselves are ever-changing, ever-evolving and ever-fragmenting the audiences attention.  
23 Reference to Twitter. 
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communications strategy are in place. Driven by the target market’s point of view, all 
stages of brand interaction are analyzed and developed to enhance the brand experience. 
Hotels are an excellent example of this element of branding. From researching your 
accommodation online (was the site easy to navigate and informative?) to making the 
reservation – whether online or over the phone (was the technology secure, was the 
reservations person friendly and accommodating?) to your arrival (was the lobby clean?), 
your check-in (were check-in personnel knowledgeable, friendly and professional?), your 
stay (were the sheets turned back? did they provide enough clean towels?), your check-out 
(was the bill correct?) and your departure (did the shuttle bus to the airport arrive on 
time?), to your memory of your stay (do you remember a pleasant stay and the chocolates 
on your pillow, or the fact that they put you on a smoking floor when you specifically 
asked for non?), and any follow-up (did they send a customer satisfaction survey and offer 
you a valued customer discount off your next stay?), all falls under the umbrella of brand 
experience. 24 Designing the brand experience, or in essence, trying to manage how your 
customers feel when they interact with your brand, is an incredibly daunting and 
extremely difficult undertaking. To ensure 100% satisfaction 100% of the time, in view of 
the incredible variety of variables, is almost impossible. However, brand experience is 
often the only differentiating factor for brands in a crowded market place. Thus, it is 
imperative to a brand’s survival to provide a seamless and coherent brand experience in 
order to remain competitive/viable. 
 
“ Global competition is fierce. Consumers are inundated with choices. Brand 
builders need to think far beyond the point of sale, and use their strategic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Wheeler, 19. 
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imagination and business acumen to deliver one-of-a-kind engaging 
experiences that no competitor can replicate.” (Wheeler 18) 
 
So, to recap, in this first section of Chapter One | On Brands | the What and the Why, in 
exploring what brands are and why they are, we have determined the following: 
 
A brand … – represents a good or service; – has a visual identity which complements its personality, and further distinguishes 
it as unique from other like goods/services (in a competitive market); – constitutes a brand promise, which gives voice to its core value(s); – must deliver on its promise in order to remain viable/competitive; – projects a distinct personality;  – must consistently, clearly and engagingly communicate its message and story;  – is experienced by its audience; – must deliver a truly unique, customer-centric experience in order to retain the trust 
and loyalty of its audience. 
 
I term these the ‘layers’ of the brand, or, in a similar vein to Frege, when he spoke of the 
words of sentences comprising a “material garment” which “clothe” a thought: 
 
“The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a 
sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence 
	   20 
expresses a thought. A thought is something immaterial and everything 
material and perceptible is excluded from this sphere of that for which the 
question of truth arises. Truth is not a quality that corresponds with a 
particular kind of sense-impression. So it is sharply distinguished from the 
qualities, which we denote by the words " red ", " bitter ", " lilac-smelling ". 
But do we not see that the sun has risen and do we not then also see that this 
is true? That the sun has risen is not an object, which emits rays that reach my 
eyes, it is not a visible thing like the sun itself. That the sun has risen is seen 
to be true on the basis of sense-impressions. But being true is not a material, 
perceptible property.25  
 
Thus these are what I term to be the layers of a brand’s clothing. Layer by layer, the brand 
identity is built. First, the intangible core, the brand’s essential value (or as the industry 
has coined, its “brand truth”), is clothed in a layer of visual identity, in order that we, the 
consumer, might engage and interact with it in a sensory way and come to know it. How it 
is in turn layered in brand messaging and communications further enables us to make 
informed decisions as to whether or not we wish to (continue to) engage with it. In the 
final layer, how we experience the brand, judging it to our liking or not, we exchange our 
loyalty (or disloyalty) for the currency of a brand’s success (or failure). It is these layers 
that intend to peel back in terms of how brands are constructed, in order to investigate the 
possibility of whether brands are real.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  Gottlob Frege. “The Thought: A logical inquiry.” Mind: A Quarterly Review. Vol LXV. No.259 (July 1956) 292. 
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Figure 2. | Layers of a Brand | Real or Constructed? 
 
 
 
1.02 | THE HOW OF BRANDS 
  HOW ARE BRANDS CREATED? HOW DO THEY COME TO BE? 
 
The process is the process but then you need a spark of genius. 
Brian P. Tierney, Esq. 
Founder, Tierney Communications 
 
 
1.02.1 | DESIGNING BRAND IDENTITY 
 
Tomes have been written on the subject of brand identity and volumes more will no doubt 
continue to be written. It is my aim to synthesize, to the best of my ability, the central 
aspects of building brand identity in order to give shape to my argument in Chapter Three. 
Fortunately, brand identity is the most easily understood aspect of brands and branding. 
Simply put, brand identity is the outward expression of a brand. Brand identity is that 
3. Brand Positioning (be) the safest car | EXTERNAL 
2. Brand Promise (to be) the safest car | INTERNAL/EXTERNAL 
1. Brand Essence/Truth/Core Value (what it is to be) the safest car | INTERNAL 
6. Brand Experience across various touchpoints | EXTERNAL 
5. Brand Communications messaging across various channels | EXTERNAL 
4. Brand Identity | visual, verbal | colour, name, tagline, logo | EXTERNAL 
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which an audience or consumer interacts with – either mentally or physically, or both. It is 
constructed in collaboration between the brand owner and the branding agency and is 
therefore the creation born out of the motivation of what the creators want you to 
see/perceive. 
 
“Brand identity is tangible and appeals to the senses. You can see it, touch it, 
hold it, hear it, watch it move. Brand identity fuels recognition, amplifies 
differentiation, and makes big ideas and meaning accessible and unifies them 
into whole systems.” (Wheeler 4) 
 
As outlined above, the elements comprising a brand’s identity are both visual and 
verbal26. Verbal elements include its name,27 tagline(s)28 and its (tone of) voice.29 Its 
brandmark30or visual identity, as mentioned in the previous section, is represented by 
wordmarks, emblems, letterform marks, icons, abstract/symbolic marks or characters, 31 
colours and typefaces.32 Building a strong and cohesive brand identity that resonates with 
an audience is the primary task of branding professionals from across the branding 
spectrum i.e. agencies (creative directors, designers, copywriters, brand strategists and 
brand experience specialists) and goods/services producers i.e. brand owners (in-house 
brand keepers, communications specialists and marketers)33. In a nutshell, brand identity 
is that to which audiences are attracted and relate. The relationship between a brand’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid, 113. 
27 For definition see Brand Glossary. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Simmons,115. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Wheeler, 48-64. 
32 Simmons, 114. 
33 The process of brand building itself is addressed in the following section. 
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identity and the consumer is a rich and complex one. Consumers relate to a brand’s 
identity based on the influence and perception motivated by psychological, economical, 
cultural, emotional and pragmatic factors.  
 
How does a brand come to be? How is a brand created?  
From blank white board to ubiquitous icon, the one bite Apple that is Mac, the star of 
Mercedes-Benz, the swoosh that is Nike or the twin-tailed mermaid of Starbucks, all are 
aggressively streamlined and refined brand symbols. They are the result of an extremely 
laborious and in depth process that is refined over time and is no doubt mysterious if not 
confounding to most – the process of building or crafting brand identity. Shrouded in 
secrecy and multi-chapter NDAs, one may wonder what lies behind the curtain of the Oz-
like ad agencies that are tasked with creating and advertising brands. 
Alina Wheeler’s book Designing Brand Identity has become the veritable bible of the 
branding industry. With brilliant simplicity, she makes transparent the structure by which 
brand identity is constructed. Wheeler, a renowned branding professional, demystifies the 
process of branding by identifying five clearly defined and sequential stages or 
Visual Identity | Sample Trademarked Icons 	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categories34 that all branding teams ought consider, as well as execute effectively, when 
aiming to build a successful brand. 
 
“The process is defined by distinct phases with logical beginnings and endpoints, 
which facilitate decision-making as the appropriate intervals.” (Wheeler 102) 
 
The phases Wheeler engenders are as follows: 1) conducting research, 2) clarifying 
strategy, 3) designing identity, 4) creating touch-points, and 5) managing assets.35 It is the 
designing identity phase that I wish to focus on here. At the outset of this phase, a creative 
brief – informed by the outcomes of the preceding phases, as well as input from the client 
(often in the form of a brand brief),36 and (usually) the responsibility of the client brand 
and/or client account manager – is employed to give direction to the creative team 
regarding the task at hand; building the brand identity.  
 
What exactly is a Creative Brief? 
“In simplest terms, it is a framework or foundation for your creative approach. It 
contains a well-identified and articulated summary of the key factors that can 
impact a project: background overview, target audience details, information on 
competitors, short- and long-term brand and business goals, as well as specific 
project particulars.”37 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Wheeler, 102-103. 
35 Wheeler, 6. 
36 A brand brief is an internal document that outlines the company’s value proposition, audience, mission, vision, values and brand 
messaging. 
37 Terry Lee Stone. “Creative Briefs in Shifting Times”. http://www.commarts.com/columns/creative-briefs-shifting; accessed 27 Aug 
2014. 
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The goal of every creative brief is to inspire the creative team to come up with a uniquely 
creative solution to the current problem or opportunity. A creative brief is a crucial tool 
that helps to unite the disparate members of a creative team – the designers, the strategists 
the copywriters, the user-experience (UX) designers, the videographers etc. – under one 
language; the language that will give shape, voice and identity to the brand. With regard 
to content, a creative brief typically contains the following elements: 38  
 
i. Context. Identifies the client and the good or service to be introduced. It outlines 
the brand value proposition or promise and what the brand stands for, as well as 
any research the client can provide regarding current market conditions for the 
category i.e. business climate. 
ii. Project Overview. Identifies the nature of the task at hand. What is the problem 
motivating the client to seek a solution? What is it that needs to be created? 
iii. Key Drivers. Identifies the goals of the project. It outlines the primary objective, 
as well as any other sub-objectives. What is the desired effect i.e. thought, feeling 
or action to be evoked by this project? 
iv. Intended Target Audience. Identifies the consumer for the product or service. 
Audience “personas”39 and ethnographic data are provided of primary, secondary 
and tertiary audiences (if relevant). 
v. Competitive Landscape. Identifies the current and potential future players in the 
client’s category – and if possible, their strengths and weaknesses. 
vi. Tone of Voice. Identifies the brand’s personality in terms of vocabulary and 
behavioral style in terms of communicating the project’s message. 
vii. Main Message. What is the one thing that the client wants the intended audience to 
“take away” from the experience of interacting - whatever form(at) that might be - 
with this project? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid. 
39 See Brand Glossary. 
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viii. Desired Visuals. Identifies the parameters for desired visuals. Are they new? 
Repurposed? What is the subject matter? Are they to resemble any existing styles? 
Do they have to adhere to any existing brand guidelines or other limitations? 
ix. Project Details. Outlines all administrative requirements and deliverables, 
timeline and budgets. 
x. Team. Identifies those who will be part of the project, both agency-side and client- 
side; includes a reporting structure and required reporting methods. 
 
Once the client signs off on the contents of the creative brief, the creative team begins the 
process of building the brand’s identity. (For the most part) there is no mystery to this 
phase. Each team member is skilled in his or her craft and executes according to task as 
outlined in the creative brief. The designers design, the writers write, the strategists 
strategize and the account/client manager manage(s) the account client. Yet before they 
can execute, they have to come up with the big idea40 that will ideally address the nature 
of the problem the client is facing e.g. to create a new brand for a new line of flavoured 
water – say Vitamin Water (before it was), for instance. Generating ideas is, of course, not 
unique to branding agencies. Brainstorming or “blueskying” as it is sometimes referred to, 
is an integral part of any discipline or corporate strategy that seeks solutions to an existing 
problem. Yet in relation to designing brand identity, during this collaborative ideation 
phase, a brainstorming system is unique and central to the agency’s methods. In general, 
the process can be articulated as something along the lines of the following: (ideally) the 
entire creative team (2 or more people depending on the size of the firm) sits around a 
table (or randomly/ leisurely throughout some sort of ‘space’) and usually in front of a 
white board or some such medium on which ideas can be “shared”. Moderated by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Wheeler, 16. 
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most senior members of the team, usually a creative director, the client’s 
problem/objective/desire(s) and the creative brief’s parameters are discussed, research 
data is presented and assessed, and ideas are generated based those criteria in order to 
develop creative solutions.41 
 
Interestingly, many creative types will admit that they don’t know where their creative 
ideas come from. “They just ‘come out of nowhere.”42 As curious and interesting as this 
aspect of building brand identity is, it will take us too far afield from the project of this 
thesis. So, for now, I will limit my investigation into brainstorming to something more 
process oriented. Again, ideas bounded by the parameters of the creative brief are bandied 
about and fuelled by copious cans or cups of caffeine and catered cravings (pending the 
project budget). Once the topic has been exhausted, usually a good day’s work (or longer 
depending on project timeline and, again, the budget), the account manager distills the 
information and presents it to the creative director who polishes the concepts (often three 
alternatives) and sends instructions for the team to execute.  
 
Once again, the designers design, the writers write, the strategists strategize and the 
account managers manage and report on the progress of the project. When complete to the 
satisfaction of the creative director, the client is invited back to the agency (or hosts the 
agency) for a “show and tell’ meeting, wherein the agency pitches the concepts generated 
and the rationale behind them to the client. The client then reviews each concept and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 As a quick segue, this activity is often romanticized in movies or on television when depicting ad agencies. On Mad Men, the “boys” 
are usually enjoying a glass (or two) or neat scotch and cigarettes or cigars to get the creative juices flowing. While magazines, 
whether business or creative, abound with images of funky loft spaces filled with beanbag chairs, basketball hoops and foosball tables, 
while greying executives dressed in sneakers, jeans and fashionably monikered t-shirts, wittily cajole their fresh-faced twenty-
something staff drinking brand label coffee or … you guessed it …Vitamin Water (which is owned by Coca~Cola btw). 
42 See the documentary film Art & Copy 2009. 
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decides which one in particular it wishes to pursue i.e. falls in line with its expectations, 
aspirations and objectives, and directs the agency to finalize the all features of the brand’s 
identity43 – which, depending upon the scope of the project, can take a matter of days, 
weeks or even months. Moreover, the client’s decision may not always be cut and dry – 
like choosing B from a range of A, B, and C. Sometimes, the client chooses 
predominantly B, but wants to add some element of A and something similar to C. While 
not optimal to the process, this is not unusual – the client is always right after all, not to 
mention paying the bills. And so the brand concept is once more refined in order to 
accommodate the client’s wishes – though it must be said, not always to the betterment of 
the brand, albeit sometimes. 
 
What Constitutes Good vs. Bad Branding? 
To attempt to discuss what constitutes good vs. bad branding may be as futile (not to 
mention volatile) as discussing what constitutes good and bad art. However, on one level, 
good branding may be somewhat easier to ascertain, as it is measurable by transactions. 
Sales of Coke over Pepsi,44 for instance, would seemingly indicate that Coke is the more 
successful brand. Yet from the perspective of a financial officer, Coke may spend more 
advertising dollars than Pepsi, giving Coke an advantage that directly impacts sales, albeit 
at a higher operating cost. So what, other than favourable sales data, might constitute a 
successful branding? There are some general criteria that most in the branding profession 
could agree upon (if not consumers) as there are subtle differences between a “good” vs. a 
“successful” brand. Quite simply, however, a successful brand is a brand that endures. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This process applies not only to the building of brand identities, but also to promotional campaigns for existing brands and 
rebranding projects. 
44 Interbrand’s 2013 Top 100 brands. 
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order to endure, the brand must, over time, consistently resonate with its audience and 
deliver on its promise. It does this by … 
 – not alienating audiences with its visual or verbal identity; – communicating its identity authentically to audiences with stories that resonate, 
are relevant and engage them;45  – choosing platform(s)46 which audiences use/are familiar with i.e. use; – consistently delivering on its promise, which  
a. generates trust/loyalty, and 
b. motivates audiences to act. 
 
A good brand need not be an ideal brand (such as Apple). Though ideal brands are good 
and successful brands, a good brand is simply one that is honest with itself and its 
audience and fulfills its promise;47 and one that the audience identifies with, believes in 
and trusts. Though we are here speaking in mass terms, a successful brand is successful 
only because it wins over one customer at a time. That is to say in winning over one 
customer, it might also, coincidentally, be winning over your neigbour at the same time, 
and your neighbour’s neighbour and so on48 until it can be seen to effect an entire 
generation. This phenomenon can be illustrated through the success of Pears Soap over 
the years. You may currently use Pears Soap because, for example, your grandmother 
used Pears soap, your mother and aunts use Pears soap and so you too have grown fond 
and strangely loyal to Pears soap. But it may also be that every experience you have had 
with any other soap is just not the same as your experience with pear soap. It does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Its personality speaks to them. 
46 Technology/media platform. 
47 See Appendix for examples of what the branding industry consider good branding. 
48 This may remind some older readers of a 1980’s Faberge Organics Shampoo commercial.  
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make you feel the same i.e. it does not have the same effect on you, and thus you don’t 
have the same experience. The smell of Pears that evokes the memory of your 
grandmother is not present in any other soap, etc. Personal experience plays a substantial 
and significant role in the success of many brands, as do group/social and cultural factors 
– which, is why, en masse, brands can effect an entire generation – though not always. 
 
As for what makes for poorly designed brands or bad/unsuccessful branding, sometimes it 
is more efficient to “show” rather than “tell”. To that end, I have added a small number of 
examples to the Appendix at the end of this thesis for those interested. However, some 
process-oriented factors that may contribute to unsuccessful branding are here worth 
considering. 
 
1. The provider of the good/service is out of touch with its audience. 
2. The agency does not listen to the client or does not fully adhere to the creative 
brief. 
3. Incorrect assumptions are made during the research phase. 
4. Incorrect interpretations are made of the data during the research phase. 
5. Incorrect questions are asked during the research phase. 
6. Ethnographic considerations are omitted. 
7. The competitive landscape is misunderstood. 
8. The market cannot absorb another similar product/service i.e. is currently 
saturated. 
9. No research is conducted. 
10. There is no use (need) for the product or service. 
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Bottom-line: Somewhere along the way49 there is a disconnect. Errors have been made. 
Data has been misinterpreted or crucially overlooked. Markets have been misjudged. 
Cultural subtleties have not been considered. A disconnect between a brand and its 
audience is lethal, as can be seen in the case of the Eatons50 department store chain in 
Canada and the near demise of the GAP.51 
 
***** 
 
So, to conclude this section and thereby the first chapter of this thesis, the designing of a 
new brand identity requires that all stakeholders participate using the same information, 
follow the same designated framework and work within a flexible (and amply funded) 
environment that allows for an iterative process of revisions in order to create and launch 
a successful brand into the marketplace. What I hope has emerged as evident, is that 
building brand identity successfully requires not only accurate research and creative 
acumen, but it fundamentally necessitates the ability to translate the research data into not 
only “the big idea”, but “the right big idea”. This insight will be relevant in Chapter 
Three. But for now, I leave the world of brands and branding and turn my attention to the 
realism debate as mapped by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, re-envisioned by Michael 
Dummett and refined by Crispin Wright, in order to ascertain whether or not it might be 
possible for brands to stand as real in a metaphysical sense or merely constructed. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The way referring to Ms Wheeler’s 5 stages. 
50 http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/economy-business/consumer-goods/eatons-a-canadian-institution-1/end-of-eatons.html; 
accessed 19 June 2014. 
51 http://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarathau/2013/08/16/the-gap-anatomy-of-a-brand-comeback/; accessed 19 June 2014. 
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CHAPTER TWO | A REALIST/ANTI-REALIST TOOLKIT 
 
 
 
As stated in my introduction, the project of this thesis is to investigate the metaphysical 
nature and status of brands. If mine were a contribution to a longstanding and ongoing 
metaphysical debate, such as the debate about numbers or mental states, there would be a 
vast repository of literature from which I could draw. There is, however, no such literature 
in the case of brands. And yet fortunately, in the latter half of the 20th Century, 
philosophers increasingly focused their attention on the higher-level question of how to 
characterize metaphysical positions and carry out what had become entrenched disputes in 
a new, productive and meaningful way; more specifically, what makes a view “realist” or 
“anti-realist” has become a crux in contemporary discussions of realism. So it is to this 
literature that I turn for guidance and assemble a toolkit to help me answer the question 
“Are brands real?”  
 
In this Chapter, I examine influential and increasingly subtle proposals of three highly 
regarded philosophers engaged in current discussions of how we might make progress in 
debates about the reality of a particular class of things. First, I consider the simple yet 
effective conceptual approach, anchored predominately but not exclusively in ethics, 
offered by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. However, Sayre-McCord’s proposal assigns “truth” 
as the property solely of the realist; that is, if there are claims about a class of entities that 
are literally true then, by McCord’s lights, realism is correct for that domain, which may 
prove problematic – in the case of Berkeley for example.  Recall Berkeley’s famous 
proposal that claims about the non-mental world, are, properly understood, claims about 
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what it is possible for minds to perceive.52 As Berkeley insisted, this did not make claims 
about tables and chairs untrue.  On this view, Sayre-McCord’s account runs the risk of 
making Berkeley out to be a realist about physical objects – a categorization that might 
have pleased Berkeley, but most other philosophers would find genuinely disquieting.   
And so I move on to review Michael Dummett’s pivotal contribution to this debate, 
isolating the category of semantic anti-realism.53  
 
Whereas Sayre-McCord recognizes the existence of views we might describe as semantic 
anti-realist, in his characterization all such views are relegated to the non-cognitivist 
category.54 Dummett’s account is profitably viewed as distinguishing notions of truth that 
make truth no longer the exclusive property of the realist. That is, he identifies notions of 
truth that allow for the truth of some claims about a certain domain (so the view is a 
cognitivist one), and yet qualifies as anti-realist.  In tying truth to the internal rules of 
language for anti-realists and to reference for realists, the most interesting questions in 
debates about realism are, for Dummett, semantic questions – questions about what is 
required for statements in a particular class to be true.  Yet despite its many virtues, 
including the attempt to bring both realists and anti-realists to the table by providing them 
with uniform lines of argument,55 Dummett’s account is criticized by many for producing 
a one-size-fits-all criterion for realism.  This seems somewhat limiting and hence 
problematic, as it leaves us with a tool that, though allowing us to declare both claims 
about comedy and claims about morals as “unreal”, fails to make further, more refined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 George Berkeley (1685-1753). Esse is percipi - to be is to be perceived.  http://www.iep.utm.edu/berkeley/; accessed 9 Sept. 2014. 
53 Or, as he argues “research programme” Dummett, Realism and Anti-Realism, p463. 
54 As by his lights, realism relies on two main principles: 1) disputed claims must not only have truth-values (i.e. must satisfy truth 
conditions), but 2) that some of those disputed claims must have their truth-values true. (Sayre-McCord, 10) 
55 Michael Dummett. The Seas of Language. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1993) 464. 
	   34 
distinctions. For instance, while the wrongness of bombing innocent civilians might not 
be real in the same way as the earth’s atmosphere is real, surely such morally abhorrent 
acts could be argued to be more real than the infamous humor of Monty Python or 
Saturday Night Live? 
 
Thus, in view of my aim to determine whether or not brands are real or constructed, I find 
both Sayre-McCord and Dummett’s approaches wanting in terms of subtlety, as I suspect 
the answer to the question “Are brands real?” is somewhat more nuanced and complex 
than it seems on the face of it. And so I turn to examine a third account offered by 
Dummett’s most famous pupil, Crispin Wright, in his seminal work Truth and Objectivity. 
For Wright, the problem with many debates about realism is that they assume that the 
question “Are Xs real?” has a “Yes/No” answer. While, if Wright is right, the question, 
like most pithy philosophical questions, is better answered: “Well, quite frankly, it 
depends what you mean.”  According to Wright, the question of “reality” is not 
unambiguous. It is possible for entities of some sort to be real – or as he prefers to say, 
objective – in some respects, but not others.  And so, in the third section of Chapter Two, 
I describe three different criteria for objectivity offered by Wright. 
 
Finally, the purpose of this second Chapter is not to advocate any one of these accounts of 
realism/anti-realism over the others. Rather, I am herein merely assembling a toolkit, 
which I will employ in Chapter Three in order to construct a plausible answer to the 
question regarding the metaphysical status of brands.  But first, in order to properly set the 
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foundation for my investigation, I begin with a general description of realism and the 
debate itself. 
 
 
2.01 | REALISM 
          THE DEBATE  
 
WHAT IS REALISM?  
So, what is realism? What and how can we know something to be true or false about a 
particular domain? Why all this talk about a debate? And why is it important? According 
to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd Revised Edition), the realism debate is 
defined as:  
“The standard opposition between those who affirm, and those who deny, the 
real existence of some kind of thing, or some kind of fact or state of affairs. 
Almost any area of discourse may be the focus of this dispute: the external 
world, the past and future, other minds, mathematical objects, possibilities, 
universals, and moral or aesthetic properties are examples.” 56  
 
Interestingly, the argument between anti-realists and realists in not focused on the path of 
a discourse and what is being said, but how it is interpreted. (Sayre-McCord 2)  Moreover, 
while it is possible to debate the question of realism tout court, it is more common to 
observe and/or participate in the realism debate with regard to a particular subject matter. 
(Dummett 473) As such, one can be a realist in one domain (e.g. mathematics), and be an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Accessed 29 June 2014. 
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anti-realist in another (e.g. comedy).57 The definition goes on to state:  
 
“A realist about a subject-matter S may hold (i) that the kinds of thing 
described by S exist; (ii) that their existence is independent of us, or not an 
artefact of our minds, or our language or conceptual scheme; (iii) that the 
statements we make in S are not reducible to other kinds of statement, 
revealing them to be about some different subject-matter; (iv) that the 
statements we make in S have truth conditions, being straightforward 
descriptions of aspects of the world and made true or false by facts in the 
world; (v) that we are able to attain truths about S, and that it is appropriate 
fully to believe things we claim in S.”58   
 
A somewhat more straightforward version is offered by the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (SEP). Therein the debate is reduced to two generic yet crucial and distinct 
aspects realism is said to concern itself with claims regarding, (i) the existence of some 
class of entities and (ii) their independence i.e. the fact that X exists and has particular 
properties does not depend on “what we say or think about the matter.”59 The author of 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s Realism entry, Alexander Miller, synthesizes 
these two principles in the following succinct definition. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 “Realism”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 29 June 2014. 
58 Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Accessed 29 June14, italics mine. 
59 “Realism”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 29 June 2014. 
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Generic Realism 
“a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they exist and have properties such 
as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is (apart from mundane empirical dependencies 
of the sort sometimes encountered in everyday life) independent of anyone's 
beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on.”60 
 
Unsurprisingly, anti-realists situate themselves in opposition to either the independence 
claim (Miller mentions expressivists here, but as we shall see, he ought also to have 
included other semantic anti-realists) or the existence claim (error-theorists), or both 
(quietists) depending on the subject matter.61 This general scheme is useful, as far as it 
goes. However, for my purposes in this thesis, it is important to have a somewhat deeper 
understanding of the typical reasons philosophers land on opposing positions in these 
debates, and to have a somewhat more detailed conceptual overview of the general terrain 
of the debate. To that end, I now turn to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and the introductory 
article “The Many Moral Realisms” in his collection of Essays on Moral Realism. 
 
2.02 | GEOFFREY SAYRE-McCORD 
           A ‘CONCEPTUAL CARTOGRAPHY’62  
 
 
Though Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s main interest in the realism debate pertains to moral 
realism, which he defines as “the view that there are moral facts that we can discover” 
(Sayre-McCord ix), the moral realism debate is too extensive and complex a debate to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Essays on Moral Realism. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988) 5. 
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review within the parameters of this thesis project, nor would it make sense to do so. 
However, Sayre-McCord does offer what I view to be a useful tool with which to orient 
the present investigation into the metaphysical status of brands.  So, it is here where I 
begin. 
 
In the introductory chapter “The Many Moral Realisms” to his anthology Essays on 
Moral Realism, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord suggests a “conceptual cartography”63 of the 
moral realism debate – (it) is the view that some of the disputed claims literally construed 
are literally true”. (ibid) He unpacks his proposal thus: “ Wherever it is found … realism 
involves embracing just two theses: (1) the claims in question, when literally construed, 
are literally true or false, and (2) some are literally true. Nothing more.” (ibid) 
 
Sayre-McCord’s “conceptual cartography” first divides realists and anti-realists along the 
line of cognitivism and non-cognitivism. (See Figure 3 below.) By Sayre-McCord’s 
lights, non-cognitivists agree with error theorists that there are no ultimate properties or 
underlying facts of the matter about the domain in dispute. But rather than thinking that 
this makes statements false, non-cognitivists claim that the apparent statements of the 
domain are not in the business of predicating properties or making statements which could 
be true or false at all. Roughly put, non-cognitivists (about X) think that statements (about 
X) have no substantial truth conditions.64 Furthermore, while it is conceptually possible to 
hold various sorts of non-cognitivist views, typically the non-cognitivist view is that when 
people utter sentences they are not typically expressing states of mind which are beliefs or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Sayre-McCord, 5. 
64 italics mine. 
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which are cognitive in the way that beliefs are. Rather, they are expressing attitudes more 
similar to desires, approval or disapproval.”65 This is captured as expressivism.  
 
Cognitivism, on the other hand, holds that statements about the disputed class66 do 
express beliefs about the existence of facts of the matter and are therefore apt for truth or 
falsity. However, cognitivism, according to Sayre-McCord need not be a species of 
realism since a cognitivist can be an error theorist by holding that all statements are false. 
“Still, realists are cognitivists insofar as they think (moral) statements are apt for robust 
truth and falsity and that many of them are in fact true.”67 This view is categorized as 
success theory – the statements of the domain are apt for truth, and some of them succeed 
in saying something true.	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For further clarification, see Expressivism . 
66 I will henceforth omit this qualifying phrase when doing so should not engender confusion. 
67 “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Italics mine. Accessed 07 Jan 2014. 
Figure 3. 
A Conceptual Cartography | Sayre-McCord’s View (10)  
ERROR THEORY SUCCESS THEORY 
NON-COGNITIVISM COGNITIVISM 
ANTI-REALISM REALISM 
EXPRESSIVISM 
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So, all told, according to Sayre-McCord, “there are (but) two ways to be an anti-realist: 
embrace a non-cognitivist analysis of the claims in question, or hold that the claims of the 
disputed class, despite their being truth-valued, are none of them true (say, because they 
all share a false proposition).” (5) Notice that what this conceptual sketch of the realism 
debate does not do is speak to any central claims of objectivity, existence, mind 
independence, or any semantic thesis on the transcendent nature of truth68 and our ability 
to recognize it. (ibid) This, claims Sayre-McCord, is a “virtue,” as it allows the map to be 
as neutral and inclusive of all forms of realism as possible, and anchors it to his literal 
construal of the criterion for truth. (6)  
 
“By abstracting from these (often contentious) notions, the account I offer is 
in a position to explain why they are so often central to the realist’s position 
even though none of them is always central. The governing idea is that 
independence, bivalence, existence, etc., come into play when, but only when, 
they are relevant to whether the disputed claims, literally construed are 
literally true.” (ibid) 
 
Of crucial import, moving forward, is that the structure of the debate is interpreted, not as 
metaphysical, but semantic. What Sayre-McCord understands ‘literally construed are 
literally true’ to mean and what theory of truth is applied are crucial to his account of the 
realism debate itself.69 Moreover, Sayre-McCord believes an “important constraint … is 
that the semantics offered must be seamless; whichever theories of meaning and truth are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See Dummett in the following section. 
69 Sayre-McCord, 6. 
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offered for the disputed claims must be extended as well to apply to all claims … What 
our choice of semantic theories will influence is our understanding of what it is to say that 
some of the disputed claims, literally construed are literally true. The choice won’t settle 
whether any of the claims actually is true (italics mine).” (6) 
 
In sum, though rather simplistic, Sayre-McCord’s “conceptual cartography” offers what I 
would term a generic classification benefit, one that captures, in rough sketch, the scope 
and general characteristics of the various camps in the debate. Though keeping in mind, I 
have already noted a concern about the ability of Sayre-McCord’s cartography to properly 
classify positions like Berkeley’s phenomenalism.  And so I move on to review 
Dummett’s pivotal proposal highlighting semantic anti-realism, in order to discover 
whether he might provide me with a more refined framework. 
 
 
2.03 | MICHAEL DUMMETT 
           REFERENTIAL vs JUSTIFICATIONIST SEMANTICS  
 
“We cannot leap from a recognition that some notion of truth is needed for an 
account of our use of many of our statements to an embrace of full-fledged 
realism: rather we have to undertake a research programme. We have to 
examine piecemeal which features of our linguistic practice call for a notion 
of truth, and what notion they call for … In the course of this investigation, 
we have, at each stage, to consider whether it is plausible to attribute to a 
speaker a grasp of such a notion of truth, and how his grasp of it is to be 
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explained. All this is what I meant by saying that we have to win through to a 
notion of truth.” 
Michael Dummett. “Realism and Anti-Realism”. 477 
 
In contrast to Sayre-McCord’s account of realism, which assumes that we clearly 
understand what is meant by a “literal construal of truth”, Michael Dummett proposes that 
the inherent weakness of existing defenses of realism is that they do not win through to a 
suitable notion of truth. Realism requires a referential semantics i.e. an account of 
meaning wherein a mind independent reality fixes the truth conditions of sentences, 
because sentences refer (or purport to refer) to mind independent objects in the world, 
with the result that some claims we might make about those objects are evidence 
transcendent. So motivated, Dummett introduces an anti-realist justificationist semantics 
to defend the use of certain assertions which he believes serves to validate a more 
reasoned account of truth, and challenges defenders of realism to explain how truth could 
be anything more than what this justificationist semantics requires truth to be. This is a 
significantly different approach to truth than Sayre-McCord’s account for a variety of 
reasons. However, before I begin to examine the way in which Dummett’s view differs 
from Sayre-McCord’s, allow me the indulgence of stepping back a bit to introduce how 
his groundbreaking proposal, based on a semantic, rather than a metaphysical notion of 
realism, finds its footings. 
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A Common Framework 
In the final chapter70 of his voluminous and acclaimed book The Seas of Language, 
Michael Dummett wrote of his view for the need a “comparative study” of the many 
entrenched disputes over realism71 one finds in philosophy. Motivated by the lack of an 
agreed upon method of resolving such disputes, Dummett believed a “common 
framework” could and ought to be employed in pursuit of order, consistency and a 
“generic means of referring to particular subject matter” within each of these disputes, in 
order to make room for advances within these debates.72 Dummett believed the (abstract) 
structure of arguments for and against realism, though not identical, were similar enough 
to warrant such a framework, “from which principles would emerge for deciding in which 
cases the realist was right and in which cases his opponent.” (463-4). 
 
A Class of Statements 
Arguably his most significant philosophical contribution,73 Dummett turned the realism 
debate on its head by proposing that we look, not to the status of metaphysical entities, 
but to the meaning(s) of a disputed class of statements – of the future or past tense, or 
ethics for example.74 “Very often, realism of a particular variety is referred to as realism 
about some particular class of putative entities – mental events, for example or 
mathematical objects. I chose to speak instead of the ‘disputed class of statements’, rather 
than of the ‘disputed class of objects’.” (465) This shift in view was sparked by the keen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 This chapter was written and delivered as a valedictory lecture at Oxford in Trinity Term, in 1992 (see Realism and Anti-Realism 
footnote, 462). 
71 Dummett, 463.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Gideon Rosen. “The Shoals of Language”. Mind. New Series, Vol.104, No.415 (July 1995) Oxford University Press. 599. 
74 Dummett, 230. 
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observation that not only were many of the disputes not over entities at all, but were also 
between fundamentally differing “pictures of reality.” (ibid). 
 
 “… [S]ince these metaphysical disagreements embodied divergent pictures of 
the reality to which the statements in question related, it seemed to me apparent 
that what underlay them were divergent pictures of the meanings of those 
statements. Since no means offered itself for deciding which pictures of reality 
was correct, the more fruitful approach lay in determining which picture of 
meaning was, since in this case there was a theory of meaning to be 
constructed and a linguistic practice against which to check it.” (ibid)  
 
Dummett’s proposal is thus to root metaphysical debate in the relationship between 
language, reality and the theory of meaning, and not an attempt to debate metaphysical 
views of the existence of objective entities directly. Predominately misconstrued as 
advancing single unitary thesis by his peers75 – that is, being misconstrued as advancing a 
global anti-realism – Dummett steadfastly insists that his desire is merely to put forth a 
“research programme” in order to pose “of a question how far, and in what contexts a 
certain generic line of argument can be pushed.” (464) If successful, which of course 
some would argue it is not, his is no small philosophical achievement, as what his uniform 
line of argument offers those actively participating in the contemporary realism debates 
does, is a considerable amount of the “heavy lifting” that will allow them to advance an 
argument that has some prospect of being persuasive.  
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Mastery of Use 
Dummett, a self-professed follower of Wittgenstein and an expert on Frege, proposes a 
“non-realist, non-truth conditional, theory of meaning” as a starting point for debates over 
realism. According to this theory, meaning hinges upon “a mastery of the use in practice 
of statements of the disputed class (and which) can be explained in terms of a grasp of 
what we take as establishing the truth of those statements.” (471, italics mine). As a 
fundamental underpinning to his theory, Dummett believes that we can frame the 
challenge confronting realists in terms of it. “[S]ince we accept mastery of use as 
confirming gasp of meaning, how can grasp of meaning involve more than mastery of 
use?” (ibid, italics mine). The roots of this theory of meaning lie in Wittgenstein’s 
doctrine, that “meaning is use”. “To know the meaning of a word is to understand that 
word, and to understand it is to be able to use it correctly. Of course, in order to be able to 
determine the significance of the claim that meaning is use, we must be able to spell out 
precisely what is involved in being able to use a word correctly.”76 Dummett takes this to 
entail that the truth conditions of our statements must be “exhaustively manifestable77” in 
order to be learnable and properly understood.78 By “manifestable” he means that we can 
exhibit the correct use of the word, which depending on the subject matter, means that 
correct statements must be demonstrable or provable, or in some other appropriate way, a 
competent speaker must know what would be required to show conclusively that the 
claim is true. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Michael Dummet: 2 a) Wittgenstein – Meaning is Use http://www.iep.utm.edu/dummett/; 
accessed 9 September 2014. 
77 Gideon Rosen quoting Dummett in his article: The Shoals of Language. Oxford Journals: Oxford University Press. 601 
78 Np. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 08 July 2014. 
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A Referential Semantics 
Dummett’s view is that realism involves a commitment to a particular semantic view – “a 
thesis about what in general, renders a statement of a given class true, when it is true” 79 – 
under which truth is tied, not merely to the internal laws of language, but to its relation to 
reality. Dummett’s position is that “[t]he very minimum that realism can be held to 
involve is that statements in the given class relate80 to some reality that exists 
independently of our knowledge of it, in such a way that that reality renders each 
statement in the class determinately true or false, independently of whether we know, or 
are even able to discover, its truth-value.” (ibid, italics mine).  
 
Dummett thus identifies that which distinguishes a semantic realist from a semantic anti-
realist as the acceptance of the principle of bivalence. “Locating disputes over realism in 
the choice of a model for the meanings of statements of the disputed class tends to make 
the acceptance of bivalence a criterion for being a realist.” (467) The principle itself can 
be stated as: every statement is either determinately true or false, “that is, there are just 
two values a proposition may take”.81 Further, Dummett’s criterion for realism, unlike 
Sayre-McCord’s,82 requires a notion of truth that is possibly evidence transcendent – 
which is the crux of anti-realist discontent. 
 
“The anti-realist accuses the realist of interpreting (those) statements in the 
light of a conception of mythical states of affairs, not directly observable by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Dummett 230. 
80 Or equally, refer. 
81 Classical two-valued semantics	  Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199541430.001.0001/acref-9780199541430-e-
401?rskey=nxqEvd&result=403; accessed 06 July 2014. 
82 i.e. claims when literally construed, are literally true. 
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us, rendering them true or false. According to the anti-realist, what makes 
them true or false are the observable states of affairs on the basis of which 
we judge of their truth-value. On the realist’s interpretation, these merely 
provide evidence for the truth or falsity of the statements, or constitute an 
indirect means of judging them true or false; the anti-realist retorts that they 
are the most direct means there could be.” (468-9, parenthesis mine) 
 
Made plain, the semantic anti-realist’s position on bivalence is as follows: to understand a 
sentence is to be capable of recognizing what would count as evidence for or against it, 
and nothing more.83 Thus “the criterion for having an anti-realist view becomes that of 
occupying a position that undercuts the ground for accepting bivalence.” (467) For 
Dummett, and for many anti-realists, the central concern is: How do we grasp these truth 
conditions if they are evidence transcendent? If one can’t, as Dummett says, “win through 
to the truth” i.e. explain how our language manages to depend on things to which we have 
no epistemic access, realism cannot be correct. How can the meaning of words be given 
by a referent that it is beyond our cognitive ability to grasp?   
 
Of course, making the debate over realism one that turns on the question of bivalence is 
somewhat overly simplified. For example,  
 
 “A formulation of bivalence must allow for vagueness. The thesis that every 
statement is determinately either true or false, even if it is vague, can be sustained 
only on the implausible supposition that our use of vague expressions confers on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/dummett/; accessed 05 July 2014 (italics mine). 
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them meanings, which determine precise applications for them that we do not 
know. A realist must therefore hold that, for every vague statement, there is a 
range of statements giving more precise information of which a determinate one is 
true and the rest if false. An anti-realist may deny this, holding that reality may 
itself be vague, whereas, for the realist vagueness inheres only in our forms of 
description.” (468) 
 
However, moving forward, and for purposes of efficiency and expediency, we will set 
aside issues such as vagueness.  I will use “referential semantics” to capture this 
collection of Dummettian ideas – that the sentences of a discourse in a particular domain 
get their truth values because they refer to a suitably mind-independent, and potentially 
evidence transcendent reality, in a way that makes the principle of bivalence true. 
 
A Justificationist Semantics 
By Dummett’s lights, there are many ways language allows us to make claims that are 
true or false. However, he goes on to argue, this does not commit us to the existence of 
objects in the world to which our language refers. For instance, there are areas of 
language where justificationist semantics are correct; that is, to say that something is true 
is just to say that we have a proper justification for saying it. Dummett’s proposal for a 
justificationist semantics evolved from his desire to identify a coherent line of argument, 
in terms of adherence to a logic acceptable whether or not bivalence is true,84 that applies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (italics mine).Accessed 08 June 2014. 
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in all debates over realism. He found inspiration and a possible way forward via the 
structure of philosophical reasoning that underlies intuitionism in mathematics.  
“Although intuitionists denied that we have any conception of the truth for 
mathematical statements other than our possessing proofs of them, they did 
not postulate any language for describing proofs, to which the language of 
mathematics, taken as disjoint from it, could be reduced: they accepted 
mathematical concepts as indispensable, neither to be eliminated nor to be 
explained away. Instead, they propounded a new conception of what it is to 
understand a mathematical statement: not to know what it is for it to be true, 
independently of whether we are able to recognize its truth or falsity, but to 
know what is required to prove it. This means of rejecting a realist conception 
of mathematics appeared to me a prototype for a sustainable version of anti-
realism in all other cases.” (470, italics mine). 
 
What Dummett extracted from intuitionism and applied to the realism debate in support of 
an anti-realist view, may be summarized as follows:  Since there is no guarantee that 
every declarative sentence is determinately either true or false,85 evidence transcendent 
truth conditions are illegitimate. They can be supplanted by truth conditions based on 
justification conditions.  Unless the realist can justify bivalence via evidence 
transcendence, we have an argument undermining the claim that X is real. Evidence 
transcendent truth conditions thus fall to the wayside in favour of a justificationist theory 
of meaning.   
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A Conceptual Cartography Revisited 
Just how Dummett’s view alters Sayre-McCord’s ‘conceptual cartography’ is perhaps 
best demonstrated with a revised map that incorporates the new category Dummett adds 
to the realist/anti-realist mix. It is my hope that this diagram (see Figure 4 below) retains 
the original’s clarity, despite its alteration. To begin, the entire map is converted to a 
semantic cartography. Second, by Sayre-McCord’s lights, error and success theorists 
occupy the cognitivist side of the scale as anti-realists and realists respectively; this much 
is retained. But Sayre-McCord does not take into account Dummett’s justificationist 
semantics and the type of anti-realism he supports. Thus a new category needs to be 
added that, like error theory is both cognitivist and anti-realist, but denies that referential 
semantics is true, and therefore avoids the error theorist’s claim that all the substantial 
claims in the domain in question are fundamentally false.  
 
It is important to note that the added category of non-referential or justificationist 
semantics serves to confirm bivalence as a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
realism – as error theorists can happily accept bivalence. Further, as there is no real name 
that applies to those who accept referential semantics, since some of them are realists and 
some are not, I leave the field to the right of semantic anti-realism intentionally blank. 
Finally, Dummett’s realist, who accepts referential semantics and holds that some claims 
are true, finds him/herself quite comfortably in line with Sayre-McCord’s success theorist 
realist.  
 
 
	   51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of course, as with any ambitious influential philosophical project, Dummett’s proposal 
has not gone unchallenged. Some criticisms and attempted modifications are aptly 
described in Gideon Rosen’s review “The Shoals of Language”. In it, he makes plain 
neither Dummett, nor his “single big idea” – that “the theory of meaning underlies 
metaphysics” should be underestimated (Rosen, 599). He also points out the general 
weaknesses of semantic realism in terms of it, a) being a viable alternative to 
metaphysical realism, and b) whether bivalence and truth-value gaps really hold on 
precluding the status and commitments of realists. He questions why Dummett “does not 
take Crispin Wright’s long-standing suggestion to set the issue of bivalence to one side 
and to identify anti-realism directly with the thesis that truth is epistemically constrained.” 
Figure 4. 
A Conceptual Cartography | Dummett’s Version 
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(ibid) Conveniently, it is to Crispin Wright and his seminal work, Truth and Objectivity 
that I now turn, and leave Dummett behind. But, not without adding his notion of 
bivalence as criterion for realism to Sayre-McCord’s literal construal of truth, and thus 
strengthen my toolkit for its task in Chapter Three.  
 	  
 
2.04 | CRISPIN WRIGHT  
          TRUTH AND OBJECTIVITY 
  
Crispin Wright, a former pupil of Michael Dummett, also gives an account of realism and 
anti-realism under which truth is not the sole property of the realist. However, rather than 
giving a generic line of argument in favour of anti-realism, Wright begins with a 
“metaphysically lightweight”86 or "minimalist" account of truth that applies in all areas of 
discourse and suggests that the argument between realists and anti-realists for any 
particular domain is a debate over the nature of the "local" truth predicate for that 
domain.87 As such, he considers truth minimalism the “default” stance in the debate over 
realism. (174) For Wright, minimal truth is characterized by certain constraints he coins 
“platitudes” or “a priori laws”,88 which the truth predicate must satisfy. And like 
Dummett, Wright believes the onus falls on the realist to demonstrate “that the minimal 
platitudes leave out features of the local truth predicate which substantially justify the 
rhetoric of independence, autonomy and full-fledged cognitive interaction” (by which 
realism pre-theoretically defines itself). (ibid) And yet, Wright himself is curious as to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Wright, 74. 
87 This can be inferred from Wright’s text on page 24. However, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor and Chair David DeVidi 
for summarizing Wright’s account so succinctly. 
88 Wright, 72. 
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“whether any of the properties of a local truth predicate additional to the essential 
minimal set may somehow justifiably inspire a realist perspective on the discourse 
concerned.” (78) It will thus be useful to begin with Wright’s characterization of realism 
in general. 
 
Modesty and Presumption 
Realism about the external world, Wright muses, is a blend of both “modesty” and 
“presumption.”89 He characterizes the realist as modest in terms of the claim that the 
external world is “independent of human cognitive activity,” and that “at best, human 
thought offers merely a map of the world.”90 By the same token, realists are also 
presumptuous. They believe that despite the independence of an external reality, we are 
still able to win through to the truth about the external world in favourable 
circumstances.91 Further, since realists must be both presumptuous and modest in these 
ways, there is more than one way to reject realism, as the degrees of modesty and 
presumption will vary by subject matter.  Our presumption regarding the matter of 
humour is quite high, for surely we can win through to the reasons why some things are 
funny and some are not – despite, and perhaps precisely because, there is no guaranteed 
convergence in the matter. And thus humor, at the end of the day, is dependent upon the 
mind. Modesty, of the relevant sort, however, does not, in this case, apply. Whereas, in 
the case of morals, a realist would be both highly modest and highly presumptuous in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Wright, 1. 
90 Wright, 2. 
91 Ibid 
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terms of arguing for the existence of moral facts which lie beyond the ability to provide 
empirical proof. 92  
 
Deflationism 
Wright begins by distinguishing his minimal account of truth from Deflationism. 
Deflationists, he points out, hold that truth is nothing more than assertoric warrant – a 
device of disquotation and “not a substantial property.”93 Though he acknowledges his 
minimal account of truth as “a species of deflationism”, 94 he argues that (even) minimal 
truth must be more than that. To wit, while truth and warrant are “normatively coincident 
– reason to regard a sentence as T is reason to regard it as warrantedly assertable and 
conversely” 95 – that cannot be all there is to truth. Rather, truth must be a property of 
statements and not merely an endorsement.96 By these lights, Wright dismisses the 
deflationist notion of truth as inherently unstable.97 Instead, he proposes “that when a 
predicate has been shown to have the relevant features, and to have them for the right 
reasons, there is then no question about the propriety of regarding it as a truth predicate. 
Minimalism is thus, at least in principle, open to the possibility of a pluralist view of 
truth: there may be a variety of notions, operative within distinct discourses, which pass 
the test.” (24-25) 
 
To advance his proposal of both a minimal and pluralist theory of truth, Wright sets out to 
achieve two goals. The first is to establish metaphysically neutral ground on which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Ibid 
93 Wright, 18, 24. 
94 Wright, 24. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Wright, 71. 
97 Wright, 21. 
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debate may be staged. The second is to discern what the realist/anti-realist debate is 
actually about once truth has been “metaphysically emasculated.” (76) 
 
Minimal Truth Platitudes  
“A basic anti-realism minimalism about a discourse contends that nothing 
further is true of the local truth predicate which can serve somehow to fill out 
and substantiate an intuitively realist view of its subject matter.” (174) 
 
To quickly recap, Wright seeks to establish an inclusive notion of truth in discourses that 
might appeal to anti-realists and realists alike. In order to motivate a metaphysically 
neutral starting point for the realist/anti-realist debate, Wright argues that truth is not 
exclusive to the domains where realism is correct. (75) Rather, he advocates for minimal 
truth constraints for all assertoric content in order to assign a justifiable truth predicate. 
(76) Beginning with two foundational platitudes:98 
 
1) Asserting a proposition is claiming that it is true.  
2) Every proposition has a significant negation. 
 
Wright buttresses the Deflationist’s Disquotational Schema (DS) 
3) “P” is T, if and only if P  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98  “By ‘platitude’, philosophers generally mean certain uncontroversial expressions about a given topic or domain. Beyond that, 
conceptions about what more something must be or have to count as platitudinous vary widely.” (SEP – Pluralist Theories of Truth) 
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(albeit with the strict understanding that truth is to be understood as the property of 
declarative sentences and not merely an endorsement99) with the following additional 
(platitudinous) constraints a truth predicate must satisfy in order to be true.100 
 
4) Content is true just in case it corresponds to the facts, depicts things as they are, etc. 
5) Truth and warrant are distinct. 
6) Truth is absolute (not more or less true). 
7) Truth is stable (eternal).101 
 
With Wright’s minimal truth constraints identified, I now briefly review the interrelation 
of realist and anti-realist notions of truth. 
 
Superassertibility and Truth 
Superassertiblity (SA)102 can be construed as an extension of warranted assertibility. For 
clarity, Wright provides the following definition: “A statement is superassertible … if and 
only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close 
scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of 
improvement of our information.” (48) As such, SA is an evidentially constrained 
notion.103 Wright admits the definition is somewhat vague, but counters: “wherever our 
discourse displays some measure of convergence about what is warrantedly assertible, a 
corresponding notion of SA has to be intelligible to us. This notion may be unclear in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Wright, 24. 
100 Wright, 174. 
101 Note Wright is not tied to platitudes five and six (rooted in the work of Hilary Putnam) and recognizes them as being controversial. 
102 Hereinafter, for efficiency I will use the acronym SA unless in a quotation. 
103 Wright, 77. 
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various respects, but they will be respects in which the relevant notion of warranted 
assertibility was already unclear.” (ibid)  
 
The following quote outlines Wright’s alternate approach to Dummett’s principle of 
bivalence which holds that truth is intimately related with the feature of evidence 
transcendence, and which is, of course, unsatisfactory to the anti-realist.104  
   
“Realism is the idea that the sources of truth in the discourse in question 
somehow distance themselves from the matter of what meets our most refined 
standards of acceptability.” (81)  
 
What it lays bare is this. Truth and SA are distinct for the realist. In some domains there 
may be statements that are true without being SA i.e., which are evidentially 
unconstrained. But truth and SA don’t need to diverge in extension to be distinct 
concepts. In fact, if truth is always determinable but this is a matter of detection105 of 
something independent of us, truth is still conceptually detached from SA. Thus Wright 
captures Dummett's insight by arguing that, for the realist, truth must be more than SA 
i.e. in some way truth must go beyond our ability (even in principle) to ascertain it. But 
this doesn’t require that it actually sometimes must be undetectable. Truth is thus 
something “which is wholly between the statement and its truth-maker.” (77) 
 
Here is essentially what is at stake in Wright’s mind with regard to the realism debate: 
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IF the anti-realist wins:  “the truth predicate within the discourse may 
be construed in terms of superassertibility, and its applicability taken as 
nothing more than a reflection of the minimally assertoric character of 
the declarative sentences in question.”  
vs. 
IF the realist wins: “it would appear to be impossible to take that view 
of the discourse’s truth predicate. Rather, we shall be forced to think of 
the truth of (its) statements as truth as conferred by factors other than 
those which determine proper practice within the discourse, and hence 
as being … not of our making but rather a matter of a substantial 
relationship between language, or thought and independent states of 
affairs.” (78) 
 
Wright challenges the thinking behind the extensional and divergent relationship between 
truth and SA in the realist case. He questions whether “extensionally coincident 
predicates” might not “nevertheless express different properties?” (79) As such, Wright 
suggests other criteria, besides evidence transcendence, which may distinguish truth 
predicates for which realism is true, and for those it is not. To help illustrate, I now turn to 
Plato’s famous Euthyphro dilemma and so introduce the first tool at my disposal in the 
investigation into whether brands are real. However, before we continue, it may be of 
benefit to visually recap the three versions of the nature of truth covered thus far. 
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1. DEFLATIONISM = Assertoric content is warrantedly assertible, therefore truth is 
merely a grammatical endorsement, and not a property of statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. SEMANTIC REALISM = Truth is evidence transcendent and therefore 
extensionally divergent from SA. Truth and SA also have different sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. TRUTH MINIMALISM = Truth is evidence constrained and (warranted) 
assertoric content is truth apt in virtue of satisfying the minimal constraints i.e. the 
(7) minimal truth platitudes. Truth is therefore not extensionally divergent from 
SA and shares the same source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 
Three Natures of Truth 
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2.04.01 | EUTHYPHRO CONTRAST  
 
Consider the following claims: 
 (S.R) “It is because certain acts are pious that they are loved by the gods,” and 
(E.AR) “It is because they are loved by the gods that certain acts are pious.” (79) 
[Where (S.R) = Socrates/Realists i.e. Truth is detected, and (E.AR) = Euthyphro/Anti-Realists i.e. Truth is projected.] 
 
The actual truth-value of the respective claims notwithstanding, note the causal direction 
that the term ‘because’ implies. In (S.R) the causal direction is from acts to gods, whereas 
in (E.AR) the causal direction is from gods to acts. Now consider the content asserted in 
terms of its truth-value. In (S.R), that certain acts are pious is constitutively independent 
of the gods, and, it is their pious nature that explains why such acts are so loved by them. 
(S.R) The suggestion is that the gods have a unique faculty for “detection/tracking” of 
pious acts i.e. they “are, by their natures, cognitively responsive to piety.” (79-80) 
Moreover, “we might say: the piety of an act is one thing, and the gods’ estimate of it 
another.” (80) In contrast, (E.AR) suggests that it is the gods that deem the acts pious via 
some sort of conceptual capacity (of determining) and so they (the acts) are “constitutive” 
of the determination of the opinions of the gods (ibid). A quick way to capture these two 
positions is as detective and projective ways of looking at the world. 106 
 
Thus, in terms of truth and SA, one could frame the claims as follows:  
(R) “It is because certain statements (in the discourse in question) are true that they 
are superassertible.”  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 I would like to thank my thesis advisor Professor and Chair David DeVidi for pointing this out to me. 
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vs. 
(AR) “It is because they are superassertible that such statements are true.” 107(80) 
 
So, in relation to truth and SA, (R) demonstrates that truth and SA extensionally coincide 
and yet are divergent in source 108 i.e. the “claim will intend to advert to some constitutive 
independence of truth from SA” (81), whereas (AR) explains their co-extensiveness in 
terms of truth and SA having a common source i.e. they are not constitutively 
independent. Thus, in terms of investigating the nature of the relationship between truth 
and SA, the Euthyphro Contrast gives us insight into certain debates about realism that 
cannot be captured by discussing Dummettian referential semantics,109 but which are 
“essentially complementary.”  (ibid) The Euthyphro debate plays nicely to discourses 
wherein we have “assurances” as to the co-extension of truth and SA and “Dummett’s 
debate will be the natural focus” in discourses on the past and pure number theory, where 
our assurances are less clear and infinitely less stable.  (ibid) 
 
So, to recap, we are now in a position to spell out what is required of a realist in light of 
the Euthyphro Contrast. A realist has two avenues to show that more than a minimal truth 
predicate applies in a particular domain; either by arguing that 1) truth is evidence 
transcendent – and so truth need not coincide with SA, or 2) even if truth and SA do 
coincide, they have distinct and separate sources. However, Wright argues, these are not 
the only two routes to realism. I now turn to another alternative, which involves showing 
that there is a way in which a particular truth platitude for a predicate gives a “thick” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 or   (R) S = T ∴ SA  vs.   (AR) SA ∴ S = T 
108 Wright, 80. 
109 Wright, 81. 
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meaning beyond the (“thin”) meaning required merely for the predicate to satisfy one or 
another of the platitudes. 
 
Truth and Correspondence 
Thus having reviewed what Wright considers the “first strategy or direction of debate,” 110 
the second strategy, to which we now turn our attention, focuses on searching for aspects 
of the truth predicate that exceed the minimal platitudes, without compromising the truth 
predicate and its relationship to SA, that may justify a realist view. (82)  
 
If we approach the Correspondence Platitude (CP)111 
“For a statement to be true is for it to correspond with the facts, tell it like it is, etc.”  
formulated as: 
(CP)   “Snow is white” is true if and only if things are as “Snow is white” says they are.  
 
from a basic anti-realist point of view, we determine that there is nothing obviously 
pointing to something external/representative of what the minimal truth constraints might 
require.112  
 
“The question should be, I suggest, whether our understanding of what 
it is for this relation to obtain has, in the case of any particular 
discourse, more to it than can be derived from the co-permissibility of 
the claim that it obtains with the claim that a relevant statement is true, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Wright, 82. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Wright, 83. 
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and the co-permissibility of the latter with the claim that the statement 
is assertible.” (84) 
 
Wright's suggestion here is that the platitude is always true because it is always 
permissible when someone might say "It is true that X" to instead say "X corresponds to 
the facts" and vice versa.  The realist says, roughly, "there's more to it than just that fact 
about what one is allowed to say." So where do we look for the “additional 
substance/content” putatively required by realism? (ibid) Wright suggests we have two 
avenues at our disposal: 1) the relational term – the idea of representation, or 
correspondence which must somehow exceed the minimal truth constraints, and 2) the 
object term – the facts – which must be more vigorously conceived than currently 
supported minimalist notion of “is true” as “corresponds to the facts. ” (ibid) And so it is 
to these two avenues that we now turn. However, first, a brief overview of convergence is 
in order. 
 
Convergence 
To introduce the notion of convergence, Wright highlights, as per David Wiggins, that 
“ a defining mark of an expression’s functioning as a truth predicate within a discourse 
(is) that there should be a tendency for competent practitioners to converge (subject to 
certain conditions) in opinions concerning its application.” (88, parenthesis mine).  Yet 
the obvious lack of convergence on certain subject matters, such as morals across 
cultures, 113 for example, motivates Wright to pose the critical question: “[W]hat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Wright interestingly interjects but does not pursue the notion that a profound lack of convergence on such issues may indicate that 
discourse on these matters may not be “in the business of truth or falsity at all”. (88) 
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exactly is supposed to be the guiding connection between convergence and truth 
aptitude?” (ibid) The following is a brief synopsis of his effort to answer this question. 
Wright begins by refining a definition for convergence thus: 
 
Convergence 1 
“A class of statements are apt to be true only if there would be a tendency, in 
suitable circumstances, for competent subjects to agree on the truth, or falsity, 
of members in that class.”  (ibid) 
 
Wright believes Convergence 1 tests minimal truth aptitude well enough and is a 
characteristic of SA.114 However, this, he feels, does little more than “the claim that the 
possession of assertoric content is a necessary condition of truth.” (88) Its weakness lies 
in that “it applies to an entire class of statements with no explicit constraint on each 
individual statement within it.”115 For instance, despite widespread agreement across 
cultures on certain moral issues, it is still the case that within that domain, particular 
individual issues/moral claims exist about which there is no convergence, but which 
Convergence 1 would not address – the net being not fine enough. As such, Wright 
believes Convergence 1 sets the bar too low for any anti-realist wanting to win through 
their case116 i.e. “(f)or the purposes of an anti-realist who wants to make capital out of 
what she takes to be an irremediable lack of convergence in opinions held in some area, it 
is therefore too easy a test to pass.” (ibid) By his lights, the important question to be asked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Wright, 89. 115	  Ibid.	  
116 Ibid. 
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and answered is whether “any convergence property is plausibly to be viewed as a 
necessary condition of aptitude for substantial truth?” (90) 
 
At bottom, what Wright wants to bring to light is that convergence may be a fundamental 
“crux” between anti-realists and realists. And, problems of vagueness aside, “it ought to 
be a global property of statements at issue.” (ibid) Yet convergence does not preclude 
disagreement. He gives the example of the (lack of) objectivity of comedy highlighting 
the fact that despite a high degree of divergence of opinion regarding humor, there may 
still be a degree of convergence “in some … comic opinions”. (ibid) He emphasizes that 
“a discourse’s being minimally truth-apt” does not preclude it from allowing 
disagreement. “Minimal truth aptitude requires the operation of standards of proper 
assertibility, and consequently, the existence of criteria for the ascription of ignorance and 
error.” (ibid) So, in order to eliminate natural differences of opinion which impede 
convergence, Wright removes the permissive tendency of “tendency” (in the definition of 
Convergence 1) and thus strengthen his first draft, refined as: 
 
Convergence 2 
“A class of statements are apt for substantial truth only if each of them will, 
under suitable conditions, command a convergence of opinion about its truth or 
falsity.” (90)  
 
As revised, this version is now handily “disagreement free” and thus applicable to 
statements of genuine facts, but only those advancing “the possibility of evidence 
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transcendence truth”. 117 So far, so good. Yet despite the improvement, Wright asks just 
how do we determine/converge on what counts for suitable conditions/favourable 
circumstances? For if there is no good answer to this question, then the distinction 
between minimal truth and substantial truth would collapse. Thus a dilemma presents 
itself between applying a condition of “convergence tout court” and the umbrella of 
conditions that would promote “the emergence of a consensus”. (91) It is with this 
observation that Wright introduces the notion that perhaps convergence and substantial 
truth do not mesh.118 
 
This dilemma, Wright believes, points to the need for an additional platitude that links 
convergence with the idea of representation. He opts for a metaphor of a technological 
device – specifically a camera, fax machine, or printer – the functionality of which is to 
produce representations and thereby offers what he believes to be incontrovertible:  
 
Convergence/Representation Platitude 
“If two devices each function to produce representations, then if conditions are 
suitable, and they function properly, they will produce divergent output if and 
only if presented with divergent input.” (91) 
 
There certainly are a lot of ‘ifs’ in this platitude. Yet the Representation Platitude 
definitely merits a closer look. Wright believes such an analogy to be congruent with a 
realist line of thinking in representational terms of the world as it is. “Realism … is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Wright, 91. 
118 Ibid. 
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exactly the view that the opinions to which we are moved in the prosecution of a favoured 
discourse are the products of representational function, and are thereby endowed with 
representational content.” (92) Again, he uses the example of comedy as an illustration 
tool – this time to demonstrate the possibility of functioning representationally in forming 
our views on comedy. By the Convergence/ Representational Platitude, “our 
disagreements in output … require less than suitable conditions, or less than proper 
function, or divergent input.” (ibid) Yet, Wright points out, we don’t normally/naturally 
characterize our disagreement(s) regarding comedy along these lines. So what factors are 
“intractable divergences in opinion”119 attributable to? This question leads Wright to 
argue that perhaps the intuitive core of anti-realism (about comedy anyway) may have 
nothing to do with convergence per se, but instead has to do with comedy’s lack of 
representational content. Wright’s answer, and a second tool at my disposal for purposes 
of evaluating the metaphysical nature of brands, is the Cognitive Command constraint. 
 
2.04.02 | COGNITIVE COMMAND CONSTRAINT 
 
 “We may say that a discourse exerts Cognitive Command if and only if … 
[i]t is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, 
unless excusable as a result of vagueness, in a disputed statement, or in the 
standards of acceptability, or in variation in personal evidence thresholds, so 
to speak, will involve something which may properly be regarded as a 
cognitive shortcoming.” (144)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Wright, 92. 
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Wright’s Cognitive Command constraint can be captured by the basic premise that same 
inputs ought produce the same outputs. Thus satisfying the constraint entails, as levied by 
the Convergence/Representation Platitude, that disagreement(s) within a particular 
discourse are the result of an input error or “cognitive shortcoming.” (93) As an example, 
in terms of divergent moral views, what would follow, according to Wright, is precisely 
this:  “the notion of representation, and its cognates, featuring in such (moral) phrases 
would not be able to draw the additional substance conferred upon it when a discourse 
satisfies Cognitive Command – the additional substance imposed by the analogy which 
may then be displayed, in the context of the Convergence/Representation Platitude, with 
the products of other everyday representational systems.” (ibid). 
 
What Wright here looks to be saying is, "Okay, we actually do say things like: To say that 
it's wrong to abuse helpless creatures is to say something that corresponds with the facts. 
However, just because it's okay to say this doesn't mean that claims about wrongness are 
truly representational. The reason for this is that claims about wrongness and rightness do 
not display cognitive command.” 
 
It is important to note the following points. First, Wright seeks to stress is that “Cognitive 
Command is a significant additional constraint on minimally truth-apt discourses.” (94) 
Why? Because the standards of minimally truth apt discourses, he points out, are “highly 
tolerant, or underdetermine a substantial class of potential disagreements … and so permit 
divergences of opinion in which … no shortcoming need be involved.” (ibid). Secondly, 
Wright stresses the importance that the Cognitive Command constraint be framed “in 
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terms of apriority: of its being a priori that disagreements are attributable to factors within 
the prescribed range” in order for it to ensure its “intuitive bearing”.120  
 
So, to quickly recap, Wright proposes that Cognitive Command “is really what’s at stake 
in the long-standing debates about realism that have centered on convergence.” (146) In 
attempting to refine “the basic idea we have about objectivity … where we deal in a 
purely cognitive way with objective matters,” he suggests, “the opinions which we form 
are in no sense optional121 … but are commanded of us i.e. that there will be a robust 
sense in which a particular point of view ought to be held, and a failure to hold which can 
be understood only as a rational/cognitive failure.” (ibid).  Finally, Wright suspects that 
the Cognitive Command constraint, while not the be-all-and-end-all for the realism 
debate, must surely be that constraint which “all roads to realism have to go through.” 
(148) 
 
Where the Cognitive Command constraint focuses on the relation of representation, 
Wright highlights an additional proposal, which focuses on “the facts” and serves to  
“beef up” the Correspondence Platitude. (176) 
 
Best Explanation of Belief /Inference to the Best Explanation 
“The scientist sees a vapour trail in a Wilson cloud chamber, and he says 
“there goes a proton”. The scientist counts as observing a proton because the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Re: objectivity. (ibid) 
121 Italics mine. 
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best explanation of his visual state is that there is a vapour trail, and the best 
theoretical explanation of the vapour trail itself is a proton.” 
David Wiggins. Needs, Values, Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1987) 156. 
 
This is David Wiggins’ interpretation of an idea Gilbert Harman expressed in his book 
The Nature of Morality.122 The important ‘take away’ is that the scientist forms a belief, 
on two levels, as a result of the information processed by his senses. 1) He sees and 
registers a vapour trail; and 2) A proton, according to our best scientific theory, creates a 
vapour trail its wake. Therefore, he believes a proton is passing through the chamber. 
Thus the scientist’s justified true belief is formed as a result of observable data, which is 
cast as a feature of the best explanation of (the scientist’s) belief.123  The Best Explanation 
of Belief (BEB) aka Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is often taken to be a 
fundamental part of scientific practice and the justification of beliefs about the world.  
Harman offers IBE as a test for the reality of a class of entities. 
 
Harman’s Best Explanation Test is stated thus: 
“A discourse is more than minimally truth-apt only if mention must be made of 
the states of affairs which they concern in any best explanation of those of our 
beliefs expressed within it which are true.” (177)  
 
Wright finds Harman’s test to be insufficiently subtle and so reformulates it into 
something he deems more suitable for his purposes. Since Wright’s proposal defends 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
123 Note: Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is often taken to be a fundamental part of scientific practice and the justification of 
beliefs about the world.  Harman offers inference to the best explanation as a test for the reality of a class of entities. My thanks to 
Professor and Chair David DeVidi for pointing this out to me. 
	   71 
minimal truth aptitude as defined by the parameters determined within language i.e. “the 
syntax and internal discipline of the discourse,” the question for Wright becomes how do 
we step beyond minimally truth-apt contents in order identify features that are “relevant to 
realism?”124  Of course, as Wright recognizes, "mention of the states of affairs" is not an 
entirely clear notion, especially if the task is to distinguish "real" mention of such states of 
affairs from merely platitudinous ones.  After all, if asked – "Why did he laugh?" 
"Because the joke is funny." – is an apt reply. But presumably we do not want to allow 
realism about humor to be correct on that account.  Wright therefore spends some effort 
distinguishing genuine mentions of states of affairs from platitudinous ones.  He begins 
with a discussion of something Dummett says about Frege: 
 
“[P]ure abstract objects are no more than reflections of certain linguistic 
expressions, expressions which behave, by simple formal criteria, in a manner 
analogous to proper names of objects, but whose sense cannot be represented as 
consisting in our capacity to identify objects as their bearers.” (178) 
 
Wright believes we should interpret that what Dummett is after is a minimal and thin 
“notion of singular reference as applied to pure abstract singular terms, and thus 
insufficient to warrant the kind of realism about platonic mathematical objects”. (179) As 
such, what Wright wishes to here make clear is that though we might appear to mention 
states of affairs involving numbers when explaining mathematical beliefs for example, this 
is not enough to satisfy Harman’s criterion (when properly formulated). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Wright, 178. 
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On the issue of pure abstract objects having the capacity to identify objects as their 
referents,125 contrary to Dummett’s interpretation, Wright expresses what he believes to be 
the crucial notion126 as: “there is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with 
abstract objects: abstract objects can, in general, impinge upon us only as referents of 
understood abstract singular terms.” (180) To refine the comparison, Wright adjusts 
Dummett’s original passage as follows: 
 
“The states of affairs which (merely) minimally true sentences represent are 
no more than reflections of those sentences, sentences which behave, by 
simple formal criteria, in a manner analogous to sentences which are apt to 
depict real states of affairs, but whose senses cannot be represented as 
consisting in our capacity to identify state of affairs necessary and sufficient 
for their truth.” (181) 
 
The outcome of Harman’s constraint can be summarized as follows: 
 
1) “If unsatisfied, nothing more than the minimal truth-apt platitudes feature in our best 
explanation of belief; 
2) If satisfied, these “shadows” are shadows no longer and “we are forced to think of such 
states of affairs as lying at the source of acceptable practice within the discourse and as 
having the autonomy which that role demands.” (182) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Wright, 180. 
126 And key to understanding his (pluralist/anti-realist) position. 
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There are two plausible objections originating in the sciences to Harman’s constraint. One 
is, for those who believe “in the unifiability of science,”127 the Inference to Best 
Explanation (IBE) limits itself to states of affairs that correspond to physical laws.128 The 
other is that “theoretical science will fail the test.”129 For scientific theories are prone to 
be defeasible – consider Phlogiston for example (once invoked as the best explanation for 
fire). Restated, the dilemma of IBE is twofold: first, IBE should seemingly be immediate 
and invariant i.e. regardless of what x is, and yet, IBE ought also, if true, make reference 
to actual ultimate causes. The problem is – how far back do you go? And how do you 
know you’ve achieved the true knowledge of (an) ultimate cause? (191) Thus Wright 
concludes, based on the challenges presented by immediate vs. ultimate causes, “… it is 
actually very unclear what should count as a best explanation for the purpose of the 
intended constraint.” (ibid).  
 
In light of IBE’s obvious shortcomings in terms of how to best explain one’s beliefs, 
Wright offers the third and final tool for my toolkit to assess the metaphysical status and 
nature of brands – a Wide Cosmological Role. It is to it that we now turn. 
 
2.04.03 | WIDE COSMOLOGICAL ROLE 
 
“The crucial question is not whether a class of states of affairs feature in the 
best explanation of our beliefs about them, but of what else there is, other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Wright, 189. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Wright, 190. 
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than our beliefs, of which the citation of such states of affairs can feature in 
good enough explanations.”  (196-7) 
 
Wright here makes it clear that he believes Harman’s Best Explanation constraint has got 
things turned ‘round. Rather than focus on the states of affairs responsible for our 
attitudinal judgments, he suggests that what we ought to be asking is: “What in general 
can the citation of such states of affairs help to explain?” (192, italics mine) Of interest 
here is the change in causal direction130 from the abstract to the concrete. In effect, Wright 
moves to replace IBE with Wide Cosmological Role (WCR) in proposing the following 
alternative: 
 
“Let the width of the cosmological role of the subject matter of a discourse 
be measured by the extent to which citing the kinds of states of affairs with 
which it deals is potentially contributive to the explanation of things other 
than, or other than via, our being in attitudinal states which take such states 
of affairs as object.” (196) 
 
In order to demonstrate, as he does, the width of cosmological role practically applied, 
I now reproduce Wright’s exercise comparing the wetness of these rocks with the 
wrongness of that act.131 Wright writes, “the wetness of these rocks can contribute 
towards explaining at least four kinds of thing:” (197) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Wright, 192. What Wright refers to as a “shift in focus” of “causal power”. 
131 Wright, 197. 
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a) My perceiving, and hence believing, that the rocks are wet.  
b) A small (prelinguistic) child’s interest in his hands after he has touched the rocks. 
c) My slipping and falling. 
d) The abundance of lichen growing on them. 
 
Four types of evidence constrained “consequences” of wider cosmological interaction and 
effect over and above the statement’s minimal truth aptitude are thus attributed to the 
wetness of these rocks: 
 
1) Cognitive effects (attitudinal belief), as related to a) above; 
2) Precognitive-sensuous effects, as related to b) above; 
3) Effects on us as physically interactive agents, as related to (c) above; and  
4) Certain brute effects on inanimate organisms and matter, as related to d) above. 
 
When considering the wrongness of that act132 by contrast, it seems that cognitive effects 
i.e. the vindicatory explanation133 of one’s moral disapproval of the action (setting fire to 
a cat) and the spin off effects “on the world” such moral disapproval may serve to 
generate,134 are the only consequence of moral judgment – which, Wright muses, bodes 
badly for moral realism in this context.135  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See Wright 176 for Harman’s full account of the wrong act re: Hooligans who set fire to a cat. Albeit not the place for further 
discussion, I find the word hooligan a curious choice in this context. 
133 For a definition of vindicatory explanation see page 184. 
134 Wright,197. 
135 Wright,198. 
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Thus illustrated, this pluralist constraint has now generally been made clear. “There are 
some kinds of explanatory citation of the states of affairs with which a discourse deals 
which are licensed purely and simply by that discourse’s minimal truth aptitude – by its 
exhibition of the appropriate syntax and discipline.” (197) So we can say that “a subject 
matter has a wide cosmological role tout court just in case mention of the states of affairs 
of which it consists can feature in at least some kinds of explanation of contingencies 
which are not of that sort – explanations whose possibility is not guaranteed merely by the 
minimal truth aptitude of the associated discourse.” (198) 
 
***** 	  
So, to conclude this section on Wright (and Chapter Two), what he offers is a range of 
different approaches one might take to argue for more than minimalism for a particular 
domain. Since there are, at times, good reasons to suppose that some domains might 
satisfy some of the criteria for realism but not others, the question of realism or anti-
realism may not be regarded as a black and white, either/or matter. Instead, if Wright is 
right, the question to ask is “In what respect is this domain a more than minimal one?”  
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CHAPTER THREE | SO, ARE BRANDS REAL?  
 
 
 
UNPACKING THE TOOLKIT 
 
 
In this final chapter I gather the “tools” gathered in Chapter Two – key proposals offered 
by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright about how to identify 
realist and anti-realist views regarding disputed entities within a particular domain – and 
apply them to the question “Are brands real?” Each approach provides an increasing 
degree of subtlety and refinement to help answer the question. I apply each “tool” in turn, 
beginning with Sayre-McCord’s literal construal criterion for realism, then Dummett’s 
bivalent criterion, and ending with Wright’s advocating a pluralist approach to the 
question of realism.  
 
 
 
3.01 | APPLYING SAYRE-McCORD’S CRITERION FOR REALISM 
 
 
A LITERAL CONSTRUAL OF TRUTH 
As reviewed in Chapter Two, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s fixed account of realism is 
composed of two simple premises: “1) the claims in question, when literally construed, 
are literally true or false (cognitivism), and 2) some are literally true.” (Sayre-McCord, 5) 
On this account, “the notions of ‘literal construal’ and ‘literal truth’ will obviously carry a 
lot of weight.” (6) Thus in posing the question – Are brands real?– the answer will turn 
on the question of whether claims we make about brands, when literally construed, are  
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sometimes literally true. I propose to address that question by considering the following 
hypothetical scenario: 
 
It’s the year 2014 and JuiceCo, a national, family-run, beverage company, has 
hired a reputable design firm to create a brand for their newest line of carbonated 
natural fruit beverages for children. This product is the first of its kind in the 
market place and so affords JuiceCo both a unique first-to-market opportunity, 
as well as a distinct value proposition. It is important to note that this is 
JuiceCo’s first foray into the nature fruit juice market, having previously 
specialized only in soda pop-type beverages. Moreover, JuiceCo has developed 
their ideas for the brand’s creative brief entirely in-house i.e. no external/ market 
testing has been undertaken to vet their new product positioning.   
 
The design firm has reviewed JuiceCo’s creative brief and undertaken an 
exhaustive market research project, the outcome of which skews the orientation 
away from the brand proposition JuiceCo’s in-house branding team had devised 
for their product. The design firm decides to create two brand concepts to 
accommodate the differing data sets and present it to their client, along with the 
motivations for each individual concept. 
 
BRAND CONCEPT | A  
Brand Essence/Core Value | WHOLESOME | based on creative brief supplied 
by JuiceCo. 
Product | sparkling fruit juice for children 
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Name | Granny’s Fruit Juice 
Tagline | Tastes like old times | as supplied by JuiceCo’s branding team and 
approved by CEO) 
Product Line | Granny’s Peach Juice, Granny’s Apple Juice, Granny’s Orange 
Juice, Granny’s Grape Juice. 
Ad Campaign Story Board | Norman Rockwell-esque Kitchen scene with 
Granny standing in front of an open fridge stocked full with Granny’s Fruit 
Juice; little Johnny and Beth standing prim and shy, waiting to be given their 
Granny’s Fruit Juice. 
Background Audio | None. Real-time studio foley136 of opening fridge door 
and voiceover. 
 
BRAND CONCEPT | B  
Brand Essence/Core Value | FUN | Based on independent market research  
Product | sparkling fruit juice for children  
Name | FIZZ  
Tagline | Fresh Fruit Fun 
Product Line | Peach FIZZ, Apple FIZZ, Orange FIZZ, Grape FIZZ 
Ad Campaign Story Board | Cartoon-like animation shows children in a sun-
filled, park-like playground opening their colourful FIZZ bottles out of which 
carbonated juice bubbles in the form of fruit float into the sky as the children, 
giggling, try to catch them.  
Background Audio | Happy, child-like music accompanied by fun fizzy/bubbly 
noises. 
 
 
The CEO and Brand Manager of JuiceCo consider both brand concepts and 
approve Brand A, Granny’s Fruit Juice, much to the chagrin of the design team 
as they know that, clearly, this is not the right choice for the brand. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Real-time, in studio produced sound effects. 
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condensed version of reasons are as follows:  a) the market research data the 
design firm compiled pointed to resoundingly to fun as a main motivator to get 
children to drink healthy alternative beverages; b) wholesome was not a 
motivator for the vast majority of parents polled in focus groups and in grocery 
stores; c) Granny’s Fruit Juice creative (ad design and brand visual identity) 
speaks to an audience of conservative grandparents, not children, nor their 
parents; d) Tastes like Old Times evoked a negative response from both young 
and older audiences polled, despite JuiceCo’s insistence that the nostalgic 
tagline would spark memories in parents of their grandparents, and back to the 
days when fruit juice was natural, wholesome and homemade; and e) nothing 
about the Granny’s brand speaks to the carbonated aspect of the natural fruit 
beverage which is its main differentiator. 
 
Thus clearly, JuiceCo has made a mistake in opting for the Granny’s Fruit Juice brand 
concept. Not only does the Granny’s brand fail to reflect market preferences, but JuiceCo 
has also failed to capture and clearly identify the product’s core value. Under this lens, the 
answer to the question “Are brands real?” – if Sayre-McCord is right about the nature of 
realism – is plainly yes. There is, quite literally, a mistake being made by JuiceCo.  When 
there can be mistakes, there are true and false claims nearby.  Literally construed, one can 
make true or false claims about brands – and similarly some that are, in some cases, 
literally true. So brands are real! And yet this seems somehow too easy. To establish a 
metaphysical claim about the status of brands, one would think, would require more 
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philosophical “work” – especially if you consider that the natural inclination of many is to 
doubt the status of brands as real. 
 
 
 
3.02 | APPLYING DUMMETT’S CRITERION FOR REALISM 
 
 
A REFERENTIAL SEMANTICS   
BIVALENCE & EVIDENCE TRANSCENDENT TRUTH 
 
From the discussion in Chapter Two, we know that Dummett’s view is that a realist must 
be committed to the principle of bivalence – that is, the principle that states that every 
claim is either determinately true or determinately false, even if we cannot acquire 
evidence for it (even in principle). Commitment to bivalence follows from acceptance of a 
referential semantics; antirealists, on Dummett’s view, argue that the realist about a 
particular domain appeals to an unjustified notion of truth, because they have not 
accounted for how we could come to understand a claim whose truth or falsity may be 
evidence transcendent. The next question for us is whether Dummett’s criterion for 
realism makes for an interesting tool with which to work out the project of this thesis, 
namely, to answer the question “Are brands real?” 
 
Given the information on brands outlined in Chapter One, we know that much of 
designing brand identity, in all of its forms, is the result of human processes. Brands are 
constructed by branding professionals.  Intuitionistic mathematicians are known as 
constructivists, and it is no accident that they are Dummett’s paradigm of anti-realism. It 
is not clear how there could be unknowable truths about something that is a human 
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creation. Indeed, reflection on the tangible properties of and facts about brands – from the 
visual identity i.e. the name, colours and icons chosen, to the analysis of the data provided 
by market research which informs brand positioning, brand experience and advertising – 
show no truths which are evidence transcendent. Put simply, there are no truths about 
brands that we cannot, in principle, come to know. By these lights, realism, according to 
Dummett’s criterion, is not true in the case of consumer brands, or so it seems. 
 
Yet, allow me to point out one possible vulnerability. The core values of brands are, some 
would argue, chosen and thus mind dependent. On the other hand, whether brand 
professionals choose the “correct” core value137 is also, one might argue – indeed, I did 
argue as much when discussing Sayre-McCord’s criterion of realism above – something 
about which we can be mistaken and so not a matter of choice. But that is not enough to 
ground a claim to realism. Mathematics is, according to the Intuitionist, constructed, but 
that doesn’t mean that it is “up to us” what is correct.   
 
Notice that this is not the same as the question of where these core values we choose 
among come from. It may be fair game for realists to argue about the existence of these 
values, if, for instance, these values prove simple and unanalyzable in Moorean fashion, 
then core values may pose a potential exception to justificationist semantics. But, in and 
of themselves core values cannot be said to be brands. Fundamentally, they lie at the core 
of the brand as seen in the diagram in Chapter One and feature in brand construction in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 As we saw in the previous section’s hypothetical example between Brand A. Granny’s Fruit Juice (Wholesome) and Brand B. Fizz 
(Fun). 
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various ways – as raw material from which to choose, or the provision of inspiration and 
impetus for the overall construction process.  
 
With this clarification, Dummett’s criterion for realism still does not hold in the case of 
brands.  The answer, by his lights, is  “No. Brands are not real.”  However, just as Sayre-
McCord’s criterion seemed to provide a too-simple positive answer to our key question, 
Dummett’s seems to have answered the question somewhat too readily in the negative. 
 
Having so far applied the criteria for realism offered by Sayre-McCord and Dummett to 
the question “Are brands real?” and having found them somewhat limiting in terms of 
the insights provided by applying them, I now look to the more subtle criteria offered by 
Wright with the view of a wider horizon and a satisfying conclusion to my investigation 
into the metaphysical status of brands. 
 
 
3.03 | APPLYING WRIGHT’S CRITERIA FOR REALISM 
 
PLURALIST CONSTRAINTS 
Wright’s pivotal contribution to the realism debate is motivated by the fundamental 
question “whether any of the properties of a local truth predicate additional to the 
essential minimal set may somehow justifiably inspire a realist perspective on the 
discourse concerned.” (78) Thus, key to understanding how his position differs from 
Dummett is his view that “ [w]e ought to be receptive to the possibility that a truth 
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predicate may have certain more-than-minimal features … which in some way define and 
substantiate realist intuitions about the discourse in which it operates without entailing a 
lack of evidential constraint and enforcing a distinction from superassertibility for that 
reason.” (ibid, italics mine). Thus for Wright, as distinct from Dummett, truth and SA 
may be co-extensive in certain domains – which is to say that truth is epistemically 
constrained – and yet “realism” may still be, in some sense, correct for such domains.  
 
The reader will recall from Chapter Two that Wright considers three different criteria by 
which one can determine that truth for a particular domain is more than mere 
superassertibility (and so “realism” and “objectivity” are words suitably applied in that 
domain): 1) the Euthyphro Contrast, 2) Cognitive Command, and 3) Wide Cosmological 
Role. It is to these three “tools” that I now turn, applying each of them in turn to the 
overarching question of this thesis project: “Are brands real?”  
 
APPLYING THE EUTHYPHRO CONTRAST  
We begin by illustrating what I think is a not-very-promising way to apply Wright’s test, 
namely by trying to find a suitable biconditional and asking directly in which direction it 
makes sense to read it with a suitable insertion of the world “because.” Consider the 
following Socratic/Euthyphronic formula138 as applied to Volvo’s core value: 
 
(B.R)     It is because Volvos are safe, that certain consumers buy them. 
(B.AR)  It is because certain consumers buy them, that Volvos are safe. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Where (B.R) identifies a brand realist statement and (B.AR) identifies a brand anti-realist statement. 
	   85 
(B.R) sounds reasonable enough. Some people, especially those with small children, do 
choose to buy vehicles for safety reasons, Volvos being the number one choice among 
them.139 (B.AR) however, obviously makes no sense. The mere act of buying a car cannot 
bestow a feature upon it – least of all safety! Still, there seems little support for realism 
about the Volvo brand in this fact.  For it is at least plausible, on this interpretation, that it 
is facts about the cars and not the brand that guides behaviour here, though the line 
between the two is arguably blurred. Thus, B.AR seems more plausible if we read 
“Volvos” as referring to the brand and not just the cars – that is, it is because consumers 
buy them for their safety that it is part of the Volvo brand that Volvos are safe. 
Admittedly, we seem here not to be making much progress.  
 
So, let’s try again, this time from a macro-level rather than using a specific brand. 
 
(B.R)     It is because brands are real, that consumers engage with them. 
(B.AR)  It is because consumers engage with them, that brands are real. 
 
This recalibration pitches the question at a more appropriate level. Yet I fear it merely 
entrenches the existing Euthyphro Contrast. Rather than a linear approach, let’s try 
something different to illustrate the dilemma.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 According to the 2014 Brand Perception Survey in Consumer Reports Magazine. See Safety Category: 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2014/02/2014-car-brand-perception-survey/index.htm ; accessed 24 Aug 2014.	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Figure 6. 
The Euthyphro Contrast | A Non-linear Interpretation 
 
Visualized thus, one could argue the debate over realism, at least as it pertains to brands, 
is regulated to never-ending circularity. However, the problem is not with the Euthyphro 
test, I suggest, but with the attempt to apply it too directly. Recall from Chapter Two that 
what Wright uses this contrast for, is to draw attention to the distinction between cases 
where truth and superassertibility are coextensive because the relevant truths are 
detectable from cases where the justification conditions for the claim constitute the truth 
of the claim. So perhaps a more appropriate and relevant approach to the Euthyphro 
question in relations to brands is the particular outcome of my field research.  As I 
described in Chapter One, based on my interviews with brand practitioners, fifty percent 
of the brand identity building process is deemed creative, and fifty percent investigative.  
The creative half is itself fifty percent detective, and fifty percent projective, as these 
brand developers describe things, requiring both creative insight and attention to the 
instruction/guidelines provided by the creative brief for the task of brand building (or 
campaign design); the investigative half involves interfacing with audiences and carrying 
B.R 
It is because brands are real that 
consumers engage with them. 
B.AR 
It is because consumers engage  
with them that brands are real. 
BRANDS AS REAL 
CONSUMER 
ENGAGEMENT 
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out brand research i.e. customer surveys, interviews, questionnaires, focus groups, 
embedded ethnographic research and competitive analysis. Thus it is the process of 
designing, albeit not evenly split, is that brands can be characterized as both constructed 
and discovered. What this brings into view is a scenario in which we are faced with an 
interesting tension between anti-realism and realism within the creative and strategic 
process of designing brand identity (and thus by Wright’s lights, a tension in the nature of 
the relationship between T and SA), and which offers up no clear victor. As such, the 
Euthyphro criterion seems to provide no clear answer when applied to the question “Are 
brands real?” or, perhaps, the answer is not wholly either/or, yes or no.   
 
APPLYING THE COGNITIVE COMMAND CONSTRAINT  
As reviewed in Chapter Two, Wright’s Cognitive Command criterion works to “beef up” 
the first part of the Correspondence Platitude, which pertains to representation.140 Using 
the analogy of a camera (among other technological devices whose function it is to 
reproduce data), the constraint suggests that, within a particular discourse, the same input 
ought to translate into the same output. Divergent output (or differences of opinion), 
“unless excusable as a result of vagueness”, are therefore the result of “divergent input” 
identified as either “error”, “ignorance”, “unsuitable conditions” or “malfunction” which 
serve to produce some sort of deficiency or “cognitive shortcoming.” (93/144) To 
illustrate just such a scenario, I will apply the Cognitive Command constraint to the 
process of building a new brand identity using the following example: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Wright,147. 
	   88 
Rebranding Campaign | National Blue Bank of Canada 
Suppose the National Blue Bank of Canada has decided, after 100 years, that it is time to 
rebrand its identity. A well-established and trusted institution, known for its conservative, 
no-nonsense investment and customer service practices yet high rates of return, has been 
steadily losing market share to other banks, who, despite being less established, are 
perceived as being more client-focused and in tune with a younger demographic – as well 
as offering competitive interest rates and services. To hedge against any further decline in 
market share, NBBC has decide to undergo a change in brand identity (rebranding 
initiative) with the added hope of reclaiming its former status as Canada’s premier 
banking institution.  
 
To that end, the NBBC branding team enlists the services a world-class creative agency – 
World-Class Agency Global – to design its new brand. Due to the size of the account, the 
Creative Director assigns the project to two separate internal teams, one based in Canada, 
and one in England, in order to maximize and harness the vast creative potential within the 
firm. Each team receives the same brand brief, developed by the client, which outlines the 
“who we are” and “why we exist” of the existing NBBC brand narrative.141 Elements within 
this brief include: NBBC’s mission, vision, values, brand essence, value proposition, target 
audience, guiding principles, key markets, competitive advantage, stakeholders and driving 
force.142 The Creative Director then develops a creative brief with key senior internal and 
client stakeholders. Once approved, “the creative brief synthesizes what the creative team 
needs to know in order to do responsible work aligned with the overall objectives of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Wheeler, 138. 
142 Wheeler, 139. 
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project.” (Wheeler 139) This may include, but is not limited to: team goals, functional and 
performance criteria, communications goals of all brand identity elements, positioning, 
protocols, SWOT (strengths/weaknesses/opportunities/threats) list, functional and 
performance criteria, benchmarks and presentation dates, etc., and is reflected to the 
creative teams.143 Using both the brand brief and the creative brief, World-Class Agency 
Global’s strategy is to have each creative team come up with one brand identity concept to 
present to the client, who will then choose between the two. Briefs in hand, the creative 
teams go off behind their respective curtains and, a few months later, return to present 
NBBC with two alternative brand identities. Let’s see what they’ve created. 
 
The creative team of World-Class Agency Canada, a division of World-class Agency 
Global has created the following new brand identity for the struggling National Blue Bank 
of Canada: FIRST NATIONAL (BANK). The creative team retained the original blue of 
NBBC visual identity and incorporated NBBC’s desire to re-establish itself as Canada’s 
premier bank via adding the word “First” in its name. The team created a new logo that 
added a more modern spin to the original design as a subtle bridge from the “old” to the 
“new”. It also developed a new, more approachable brand personality/voice and tagline, 
as well as new look and feel for its website and its “bricks and mortar” branches. NBBC 
is pleased with the presentation given by World-class Agency Canada, as the team has 
clearly addressed all of the concerns and guidelines outlined in the creative brief and not 
completely discarded the old brand for the sake of something entirely new, which might 
alienate NBBC’s more traditional, established client base. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Ibid. 	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Next, World-Class Agency England present their interpretation of the NBBC creative 
brief as follows. The new bank brand is unveiled as: ROYAL NATIONAL (BANK). The 
creative team has also retained the original NBBC blue and created a less conservative 
brand personality/voice and tagline. But unlike World-Class Agency Canada, World-
Class Agency England has designed a completely new logo. As with World-Class Agency 
Canada, NBBC branches and website would also undergo a new look and feel according 
to World-Class Agency England’s brand redesign specifications. The client, in this case, 
is not as impressed as with World-Class Agency England’s proposal. How can this be? 
What went wrong? Both teams received the same brand brief and same creative brief. 
Both teams participated in a launch meeting with senior client stakeholders and the 
World-Class Agency Global Account Lead and Creative Director. Both creative teams are 
equally talented and experienced, spent the same amount of time and resources on the 
project and had access to all the same research data. And yet, according to the client, 
World-Class Agency England’s brand identity concept proposal missed the mark. This, if 
brands are “real” and according to Wright’s Cognitive Command constraint, must be due 
to a cognitive shortcoming on the part of the World-Class Agency England’s creative 
team. But what could that be? Let’s briefly examine two possible options from an acutely 
high level. 1) Cultural Misinterpretation. NBBC is a Canadian Bank. Thus, despite both 
teams residing in the British Commonwealth, World-Class Agency Canada may have had 
a slight advantage understanding the nuances of financial/banking landscape in Canada 
over the World-Class Agency England, and thus may have positioned the new brand more 
accurately. 2) Client Misinterpretation. It is exceeding difficult to “know” exactly what 
clients mean when they say they want change – and specifically to what degree. World-
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Class Agency Canada seems to have better interpreted the conservative nature of the 
client by retaining the following features of the old brand: the colour, the icon (though 
adding a modern spin) and the word ‘National’ in the name. Most importantly, it added 
the word “First” to accommodate NBBC’s desire to reclaim its original position as 
Canada’s premier national bank. Taken together, World Class Agency Canada retained 
more features of the old brand and combined it more accurately with NBBC’s new brand 
objectives than did World-Class Agency England. This facilitated less internal resistance 
from key NBBC decision makers i.e. Board Members and other senior stakeholders who 
have an extended history with the bank and who are more resistant to change.  
Thus, according to Wright’s Cognitive Command constraint, the fact that World-Class 
Agency Canada’s FIRST NATIONAL (BANK) brand was chosen as the preferred brand 
identity over World-Class Agency England’s proposed ROYAL NATIONAL (BANK) identity 
is not attributable to divergent input per se i.e. talent, opportunity, information or 
resources, but to what Wright would attribute to an interpretive error/cognitive 
shortcoming that arose when interpreting the input, thus causing World-Class Agency 
England’s to miss the mark. So, fundamentally, what the Cognitive Command constraint 
helps to identify, in the case of designing brand identity as illustrated above, is the very 
real cognitive shortcomings presented by the inputting of “the facts” and very real 
possibility (if not significant probability) of divergent “representational” outputs. 
 
Taken generally, within this domain, many similar cases exist (and will continue to 
occur). Of course, all divergent outcomes won’t model the same. For instance, NBBC 
could have misinterpreted the needs and expectations of their existing audience, as well as 
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what a younger, more moderate clientele was looking for in a bank. Thus the launch of 
newly rebranded NBBC bank as First National bank may actually miss the mark and fail 
to resonate with audiences – new and old. Had they chosen the Royal National brand as 
presented by World-Class Agency England – NBBC would have made successful inroads 
with new clients and not at all alienating existing clients, which they so feared. But now 
there is more cognitive blame to go around. Though proper investigations were executed 
on both sides, it is always possible that the right questions were not being asked, and thus 
both the data and the interpretation thereof is skewed, leading to a tangible error. Thus for 
every variation that gives rise to disagreement (of the relevant sort144), one will find 
reason for “blame” that underlies it. Or so it seems. Hence the Cognitive Command 
criterion seems to give reason for belief in the reality of brands.  
 
APPLYING WIDE COSMOLOGICAL ROLE 
According to Wright’s Wide Cosmological Role (WCR) criterion, if facts about brands 
can be used to explain a wide variety of phenomena, we have good reason to regard 
brands as objective or real.  Let’s turn to the question of what sorts of things can be 
explained by appeal to facts about brands. 
 
As most would by now agree, the Apple brand has been constructed, and arguably, 
extremely successfully so. Apple is a global consumer technology brand and thus has 
global influence, impact and appeal. Apple has for decades produced premier 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Note the use of “relevant sort” in this description.  What will be facts about brands, where disagreement will require that someone is 
wrong, are in substantial areas core values, name, tagline etc. If the two branches came back with briefs that agreed on crucial details 
but disagreed about whether the person making the pitch in the TV ads should have a west coast or an east coast accent, neither needs 
to be wrong. But this is at a level of detail to which cognitive command needn’t apply – both accents are consistent with all the facts 
about the brand. 	  
	   93 
technological devices including the original MacIntosh computers, the iMAC, the 
MacBooks Air and Pro laptops, the iPad, the iPod and the iPhone. It also developed 
iTunes, an online music subscription service, as well as a vast array of production-based 
software including GarageBand, iPhoto and iMovie, and other apps. But what sorts of 
phenomena can the Apple brand, explain?  Candidates include: 
 
1) The ubiquitous mobility of music, information and communication (via iTunes, 
the MacBook, iPhone, iPad, and iPod). 
2) The influence of purchasing decisions (motivated by a “cool” factor) and a 
technological divide between the “have” and “have-nots” (due to price). 
3) The creation of segregated technology ecosystems (e.g. PC vs MAC, and more 
recently iPhone, Blackberry and Android, and the available software compatible 
with each of them). 
4) The rise and movement towards minimalist, next generation user-experience-
based (UX) design in all aspects of life (e.g. home, cars, technology, clothing). 
5) The advent of lifestyle marketing/branding and customer experience marketing 
rather than merely product market/branding. 
6) The rise in acceptance of subscription-based content vs. ownership (e.g. iTunes). 
 
Can the Apple brand really “explain” all (or any) of these things?  While I don’t want to 
detour through a deep investigation of the nature of explanation, it is common ground to 
think that if S explains P, then (barring crazy stories of overdetermination), P would not 
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have happened if S hadn’t.  So, let’s consider a scenario in which the Apple brand would 
not have been created. 
 
1) Macs, MacBooks, iPhones, iPads, iPods and iTunes would not exist. 
And (therefore) arguably,  
2) The mobility of music, information and communication would have been slower, 
or more slowly adopted. 
3) In the absence of a “cooler” alternative to the plethora of PCs available, there 
would not be a competing influence on purchasing decisions, and thus probably no 
divide between have and have-nots. (I take it that this is consistent with less 
significant divides within the PC landscape, say between Toshiba and Dell; 
Toshiba being the more expensive of the two.) 
4) Distinct technology ecosystems would not exist, as most non-Apple software is 
universally compatible i.e. across Android and PC platforms. 
5) Minimal UX design would not currently be trending in all aspects of our lives. 
6) Lifestyle and customer experience-based marketing would not exist, or at least 
would be less prevalent and of a different nature that what we now see.  
7) Before iTunes, subscription-based content, particularly music, was facing and 
almost impossible, uphill battle.145 With the introduction of iTunes everything 
changed. Without Apple/iTunes, the take up rate on subscription-based services 
would have been markedly slower. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 I myself worked for Bell-Globemedia during the DotCom era and was responsible for launching subscription-based music and 
games services on Sympatico.ca. It was an incredibly difficult proposition – despite or in spite of the hype at the time. 
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In light of these considerations, the Apple brand and its products explain a variety of very 
real phenomena/states of affairs affecting our daily lives and thus has a wide cosmological 
role to play in “a more robust understanding of the Correspondence Platitude.”146 WCR 
thereby demonstrates, at least in the case of (successful) brands, that additional properties 
of the local truth predicate do exist which make realist considerations viable i.e. good 
enough,147 without necessitating reference to evidence transcendence. So, if we were to 
attempt to situate facts about brands on the scale of objectivity Wright alluded to between 
moral facts and facts about “the wetness of rocks”, I would, in light of the Apple example, 
argue that facts about brands fall somewhere in the middle.  This may be illustrated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Scale of Objectivity 
 
Where moral facts are mediated at the level of individuals and by their influence on our 
beliefs; brand facts help to explain economic facts, sociological developments and 
changes in production, technology, human interaction, learning and communication etc.; 
while physical facts such as moisture explain all manner of effects or consequences, 
including cognitive, precognitive-sensuous, physically interactive and brute.148 So, while 
brand facts don’t seem to figure in brute physical explanations the way the wetness of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Wright, 193. 
147 Wright, 197. 
148 Ibid. 
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rocks might, they definitely, at least in Apple’s case, cover many more scenarios than 
moral facts. Thus, it would seem, brand facts are “more real” than moral facts. 
 
***** 
 
Having investigated three significant philosophical accounts of the criterion/criteria for 
realism, we are now in a position to summarize an answer the question “Are brands 
real?”  We have reviewed criteria varying from literal truth to evidence transcendence, to 
a pluralist assortment of ever more subtle refinements – from detection and perception to 
cognitive shortcomings, to a variety of consequences perceptible in the world as it 
is/states of affairs. We journeyed from looking inward to belief, to looking outward to 
effects on the furniture of the world for explanation. When asking the question about the 
metaphysical status of a particular subject matter within a certain domain, I have come to 
agree with Crispin Wright, that the answer to the question “Are brands real?” does indeed 
depend on what is meant by the question. So if, by “Are brands real?” we mean do they 
exist independently of our minds, then, by the survey of this thesis, the answer is No. 
Brands are the products of human design and construction and therefore not real in the 
Dummettian sense.149 However, if by “Are brands real?” we mean do brands serve to 
explain certain states of affairs or phenomena that comprise the furniture of the world, 
then Yes, brands are indeed real. And so I conclude by offering that consumer brands may 
be viewed as a hybrid, both real and constructed. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Though again, a door is plausibly open to evaluate the layers of a brand individually in order to determine their unique status within 
the realism debate. Here realists may argue that a brand’s core values are indeed real. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This has been a novel journey. Investigating the metaphysical nature and status of brands 
using current accounts for the criterion/a for realism, is, I believe, a first. And in being 
first there are challenges. But with those challenges come great insights – at least for the 
author. I have gained an incredible degree of respect and appreciation for the current 
realism debate and for those who fuel it. Through the course of my investigation, I have 
become aware of, and impressed by, the depth and layers of perception and discernment a 
pluralist view offers traditional philosophical investigation. There is both comfort and 
curiousity in the response “It depends.” Comfort, in that the burden of absolute 
correctness of Yes/No, Either/Or is mitigated by nuanced and more tolerant pluralist 
alternatives. Curiousity, in that philosophical inquiry continues to move forward and does 
not become moored or stagnate in the now still waters of traditional debate. That said, I 
believe it important not to abandon those roots entirely. Speaking of moving forward, it is 
with great interest that I now turn to focus my attention on new paradigms and their 
(possible) effect on the status and design of brand identity, specifically how consumer-
based participation and engagement via social media and channels still to be determined 
may affect the question “Are brands real?” 
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APPENDIX  
 
GOOD BRANDING/ADVERTISING  
 
Disclaimer: 
For reference purposes only. 
All logos and advertising herein are trademarked and/or under copyright.  
The views expressed in/by these examples are of the authors of the citations and not of the author of this 
thesis, nor of the University of Waterloo. 
 
ONLINE 
 
PRINT | http://devisefunction.com/2010/04/05/50-beautiful-print-advertisements-for-
inspiration/; accessed 29 Aug. 2014. 
 
 
TV | http://www.adweek.com/news-gallery/advertising-branding/10-best-ads-2013-
154404#dove-real-beauty-sketches-1; accessed 29 Aug. 2014. 
 
 
PRINT/ONLINE 
 
1. Burberry Logo & Burberry Website Homepage (Source: ca.burberry.com) Accessed 
17.Sept. 2014 
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2. IPOD | 10,000 songs in your pocket campaign Chiat/Day (Source: 
potd.pdnonline.com/2010/01/3128) Accessed 17 Sept. 2014 
  
3. Walt Disney Logo & Disney World Website Homepage (Source: 
disneyworld.disney.com and disneydreaming.com) Accessed 29 Aug. 2014  
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4. Newfoundland and Labrador Tourism – Cassie Awards Gold Prix Winner 
(Source: http://cassies.ca/Home/Case_Library) Accessed  3 Dec.2013 
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APPENDIX 
 
BAD/POOR BRANDING/ADVERTISING 
 
Disclaimer: 
For reference purposes only. 
All logos and advertising herein are trademarked and/or under copyright.  
The views expressed in/by these examples are of the authors of the citations and not of the author of this 
thesis, nor of the University of Waterloo. 
 
 
LOGOS | http://fortune.com/2014/07/21/branding-gone-wrong-when-bad-logos-strike-
back/; accessed 29 Aug. 2014. 
 
PRINT | http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/bad-grammar-are-bad-
branding-157579; accessed 29 Aug. 2014. 
 
 
 
1. Lululemon (Source: adweek.com) Accessed 26 Aug. 2014. 
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2. Ernst & Young (Source: underconsideration.com) Accessed 26 Aug. 2014. 
 
 
3. SPY Sunglasses (Source: adweek.com) Accessed 26 Aug. 2014. 
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4. Hitler Clothing (Source: adweek.com) Accessed 26 Aug. 2014. 
 
5. JC Penny (Source: underconsideration.com) Accessed 26 Aug. 2014 
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BRAND GLOSSARY REFERENCES 
 
For those interested in a gaining a better understanding of branding terminology, please see 
the following Brand Glossary references: 
 
 
ONLINE | BRAND CHANNEL 
http://www.brandchannel.com/education_glossary.asp#A 
 
PRINT | INTERBRAND’S THE BRAND GLOSSARY 
http://www.amazon.ca/The-Brand-Glossary-Interbrand/dp/1403998094 
 	  	  	  	  	  
